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HOMOGENOUS RULES FOR HETEROGENEOUS FAMILIES: 
THE STANDARDIZATION OF FAMILY LAW WHEN THERE IS NO STANDARD 
FAMILY 
 
Katharine K. Baker* 
 
 
 
 
“The demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American 
family. The composition of families varies greatly from household to household.” 
      Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000)  
 
As Justice O’Connor suggested a decade ago, there may not be a typical 
American family.  But there are, increasingly, typical family law obligations.  As the 
marital nuclear family diminishes in prevalence and as academic calls for a more fluid, 
contextual legal understanding of family grow by the day, the law of family obligation is 
moving in the opposite direction.  The obligations the law imposes on one because one is 
a family member are becoming increasingly formulaic, uniform and status-based, even 
while functional and intellectual forces would seem to be pulling the law in the opposite 
direction.  
This article explores the law of family obligations: child support, property 
distribution, and alimony.   These obligations are imposed primarily upon what we think 
of as family dissolution, but they help express the legal meanings of parenthood and 
marriage for all.1  In particular, they illuminate how the law constructs parental and 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.  I would like to thank Susan Appleton, Naomi Cahn and 
June Carbone for very helpful comments.   
1 As discussed infra text accompanying notes 61-69, child support is often imposed not only when the 
family dissolves, but when it starts, at the birth of a child.  Property division and alimony adjudications 
come only in the event of divorce. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782051
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marital commitments.  One might think that these legal meanings would help shape the 
social meanings of parenthood and marriage, just as evolving social understandings of 
family would influence the development of the law.   But there is a striking dissonance 
between how the law is shaping the meaning of family and how people seem to assume 
the meaning of family is changing.  
Much recent family law scholarship, reflecting the reality of new family forms, 
extols the virtues of a more expansive, contextual legal understanding of family.  The 
contemporary adjudication of family obligations, on the other hand, suggests a stark 
resistance to contextual evaluation of commitments.   Among those who live and work in 
the world of family law obligation, there is a yearning for predictability and efficiency.    
Context is expensive and invasive. The social changes that have generated the calls for 
more attention to context include greater diversity in family form and more acceptance of 
that diversity by the general public.  But the more varied the potential family forms, the 
more expensive and invasive a law that evaluates context becomes.  Effective legal 
enforcement of family obligation may require legal definitions of family that inevitably 
impede expansive, contextual understandings of family. 
This article argues that despite the profoundly limited way in which the current 
law identifies families, some reliance on restricted legal definitions of family will be 
necessary for any meaningful system of family obligation to operate.  While 
demonstrating how arbitrary most of the rules surrounding family definition and 
obligation are, the article defends that arbitrariness in general, if not in its particulars, as 
being a legitimate and likely non-controversial means of ensuring efficient determination 
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of obligation.  A system with a much less limited understanding of family would likely be 
a system with much less enforceable family obligation.   
The argument proceeds as follows.  Part I provides a summary of the 
demographic changes to the family during the last 40 years, with a brief overview of 
some of the academic response to those changes.  Most of the scholarship seems to 
implore the law to either recognize more kinds of families or to cease recognizing (and 
thereby privileging) any family forms.  Part II describes the changes to the law of family 
obligation during the period in which the demographics of family life changed.     Forty 
years ago, context and discretion were everywhere in the law of family obligation.  
Today, it is common to see statutes consisting of little more than econometric formulas or 
percentages that calculate obligation.  Part III delves more deeply into those formulas.   
By unpacking the formulas, one sees that family law has turned to algorithms not 
because reformers have come to agreement about the origins and scope of family law 
obligation but because they have not.  The formulas are riddled with arbitrary and 
contested conclusions about who should be obligated and for how much.  But once those 
conclusions have been incorporated into a formula, they help create their own sense of 
fairness:  At least formulae render predictable results.    
Part IV offers a defense of the formulaic arbitrariness and suggests that there is a 
causal connection between increasingly heterogeneous family forms and homogenous 
legal obligations.   Ever fluctuating family forms make the need for practical, enforceable 
obligation determinations more urgent.2  Intuitive understandings of abstract obligation 
coupled with controversial concepts of why obligation should be triggered and in what 
                                                 
2 For instance, when living apart from one’s children becomes more common, child support enforcement 
becomes an important issue for many more households.  When couples split up more often, property 
distribution rules seem more salient to many people’s lives.  See infra Part IV.   
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amounts have led to a compromise of sorts.  Because reformers cannot agree on 
principles that will lead to fair outcomes in the majority of cases, they have settled for 
rules that can lead to consistent and efficient outcomes in the majority of cases.   
Part V situates the analysis of family law obligation in the contemporary 
academic debates concerning the state’s role in conferring family status.  First, it 
highlights how the embrace of formulas indicates a willingness to cede considerable 
authority to the state.  For the formulas to work, there need to be readily ascertainable 
legal definitions of family.  The state provides those definitions.  Recognizing the 
primacy of the state’s role in defining obligation has opposite implications for different 
constitutional claims to family.  It undermines fundamental rights claims to marriage and 
parenthood, while strengthening equality claims to those same family statuses.  In light of 
those findings, the article then questions whether contemporary academic calls to 
diminish the importance of family status run the risk of diminishing the existence of 
family obligation. Part VI concludes. 
 
I. The Destandardization of the Family 
Just ten years after Justice O’Connor suggested that there was no longer an 
average American family, her words have become almost cliché.  No one seems surprised 
by the numbers anymore.  Traditional nuclear families, defined as heterosexual married 
couples living with their own children, make up less than ¼ of all households in the 
United States.3  By 2008, more than 40% of all newborns were born to unmarried 
                                                 
3 Jason Fields, America’s Families and Living Arrangements:  2003 at 2 (US Census Bureau 2003) (down 
from 40% in 1970). 
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women.4  40% of all single mothers never marry.5  One third of adults (and 40% of adults 
under age 50) have cohabited with someone without being married.6 One in six children 
are born to a cohabiting couple and one half of those children will have had their parents 
separate by the time they are 9 years old. 7   
The divorce rate hovers at 50% of all marriages.  It is slightly lower among whites 
(47% ), but significantly higher among African-Americans (70%).8   Of children born to 
married parents, 25% will have their parents divorce by the time they are 9 years old.9    
Children with cohabiting parents are more likely than children of divorced parents to find 
their custodial parent in a new cohabiting relationship within a few years of the break-
up,10 but children of divorced parents are still likely to experience a new family.  Fifty-
four percent of divorced women remarry within five years of divorce and 75% of 
divorced women remarry within 10 years.11  
Reproductive technology and gay rights have also upended traditional 
understandings of family.  Genetic material and reproductive labor can now be purchased 
in open markets by men and women.  Gay men and lesbians can marry in 5 states12and 
                                                 
4 Gretchen Livingston and D’Vera Cohn, The New Demography of American Motherhood, Social and 
Demographic Trends Project, Pew Research Center, May 6, 2010.  
5 Paul Taylor, Cary Funk and April Clark, As Marriage and Parenthood Drift Apart, Public Is concerned 
about Social Impact, at 61 (Pew Research Center 2007) 30 [Hereinafter Marriage and Parenthood]  
6  Marriage and Parenthood, supra note 5 at. 3 
7 ANDREW CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA 
TODAY 164 (Random House 2009).  
8 Id. at 170.   
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 164.  The typical parent who has several intimate partners while raising her children is a white 
female high school graduate.  African-American women are more likely to have children without as many 
partners.  Latinas are less likely than whites to have as many break-ups. Id.  
11 CDC, Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce and Remarriage in the United States, July 2003.  
12 Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, Iowa, and New Hampshire allow same sex couples to marry, as 
does the District of Columbia.  
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enter into the legal equivalence of marriage in several others.13   Gay couples openly 
parent children together.  Most states allow gay individuals to adopt and many allow a 
gay man or lesbian woman to adopt his or her partner’s child.14   
Then there are the economic and gender changes.  In 1970, only 4% of wives 
earned more than their husbands.  By 2007, 22% of wives out-earned their husbands.15  
Approximately 70% of mothers with children under age 18 work outside the home and 
65% of married mothers work outside the home.16  More than 50% of college graduates 
today are women.17  In 1970, 37% of college educated husbands had college-educated 
wives.  By 2007, that percentage had leaped to 71%.  In 1970, no more than 1% of 
business, law or medical students were women.18  Today, 49% of medical students are 
women,1947% of law students are women20 and 37% of business school students (MBAs) 
are women.21  
For the most part, people accept the legitimacy of these changing demographics.22  
Women’s access to higher education and equal employment opportunities are thoroughly 
                                                 
13 New Jersey, California and Illinois offer gay and lesbian couples all of the legal incidents of marriage, 
but not the name marriage.    
14Gary J. Gates, M.V. Lee Badgett, Jennifer Macomber, Kate Chambers, Adoption and Foster Care by Gay 
and Lesbian Parents in the United States, at 3, The Williams Institute at UCLA School of Law, March 
2007; Human Rights Campaign, Parenting Laws: Second Parent Adoption, http://www.hrc.org, updated  
April 10, 2010. 
15  Paul Taylor, Richard Fry, D’Vera Cohn, Wendy Want, Gabriel Velasco, Daniel Dockterman, Women, 
Men and the New Economics of Marriage, (Pew Research Center, 2010) [Hereinafter New Economics]   
16 U.S .DEPT. OF LAB BUREAU OF LAB STATISTICS, NEWS, EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES IN 
2005, tbl 45 (April 27, 2006) Oct. 18 2006  
17 Id.  (53.5% of college graduates are women).  
 18 NAOMI CAHN AND JUNE CARBONE. RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE 
CREATION OF CULTURE  79 (Oxford University Press 2010).  
19  Association of American Medical Colleges, Women in US Academic Medicine: Statistics and 
Benchmarking Report 2008-2009 at 12.  
20 ABA Legal Education Pages, Enrollment and Degrees Awarded 1008-09, at 1. 
21 The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, Business School Data Trends and 2010 List 
of Accredited Schools at 24.  
22 The one change that the majority of Americans has the hardest time accepting is the prevalence of 
unmarried motherhood.  66% of Americans think that single women having children is a bad thing for 
society. Marriage and Parenthood, supra note 5 at 5. 
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non-controversial.  So, mostly, is divorce and cohabitation.  67% of the public believes 
that if parents are very unhappy, their children are better off having them divorce.  58% 
of the public believes that divorce is preferable to maintaining an unhappy marriage.23  
60% believe that premarital sex is acceptable.24 53% condone living together without 
getting married.25  55% favor allowing gay men and lesbians to enter into some form of 
legal relationship that would afford them the same rights as married couples.26 
Given these demographic changes, the academic calls for more flexible, inclusive 
understandings of parenthood and familial partnership are not particularly surprising.  
With so much parenting happening outside of the conventional nuclear family,  numerous 
scholars have called for an expanded understanding of parenthood, one that looks at 
functional relationships,27 and/or caretaking networks,28 and/or intent-to-parent.29  Some 
scholars see changing demographics and technology as necessitating less attention be 
paid to biology as a basis for parenthood.30  Some suggest that perhaps more attention 
should be paid to biology.31   Many urge courts to embrace the idea of multiple 
                                                 
23 Id at 61.   
24 Id. at 55. 
25 Id. at 57. 
26 Id. at 65. 
27 Martha Minnow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out, 62 COLO. L REV 269, 270-72 (1991); 
Barbara Woodhouse, It All Depends on What You Mean by Home, 1996 UTAH L REv 569, 576-84; Nancy 
D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mommies:  Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children 
in Lesbian-Mother and Other Non-Traditional Families, 78 GEO L J 459 (1990).   
28 Melissa Murray, The Networked Family:  Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and 
Caregivers, 94 VA L REV 385 (2008).  
29 Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental 
Status, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POl’y 1, 26 (Fall 2004); Susan Appleton. Presuming Women: Revisiting 
the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 276 (2006).  
30 MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED FAMILY (1996) (arguing that the legal family should be understood 
as centered around a binary caretaker/child dyad not a sexualized adult relationship that might produce 
children); Baker, supra note 29, at 48, (suggesting that a woman should have all of the parental rights at 
birth, absent an agreement indicating an intent to share). 
31 Annette Appel, Controlling for Kin:  Ghosts in the Postmodern Family (suggesting that children 
experience biological connection as an important part of identity and therefore the law should be careful 
not to exclude birth mothers or genetic donors from definitions of family) (WASH UNIV. FACULTY PUB. 
SERIES) 
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parenthood. 32 Others argue that perhaps the law should limit the number of parents to 
one.33 
There have been comparable calls for the restructuring of marriage and sexual 
relationships.  Many commentators bemoan the narrow, stifling manner in which the 
legal recognition of marriage regulates adult intimacy.34  Given the deregulation – and 
constitutional protection - of most consensual adult sexual activity,35 the idea of steering 
people toward monogamous, long-term relationships seems anachronistic and pointless to 
some.36  In the midst of the same-sex marriage debate, numerous articles have questioned 
state involvement in marriage at all.37  One scholar has suggested that the law should 
allow each individual to distribute the various benefits of marriage to a wide variety of 
other adults, so that the law might better capture the importance of friendship.38  Others 
have suggested that private ordering, or some form of partnership contract, should replace 
marriage as the paradigm to govern intimate relationship because private contracts could 
better incorporate the diversity of relationships that actually exist.39  Still others have 
suggested that perhaps the law’s relationship to family should be as its relationship to 
                                                 
32 Melanie Jacobs, Why Just Two?  Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to 
Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J. L. & FAM STUD 309 (2007); Laura Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 
WASH UNIV. J L & POL’Y 47 (2007). 
33 Fineman, supra, note 29.  
34 Katherine Franke, Sexuality and Marriage:  The Politics of Same Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 236, 239-240 (2006) (depicting gay couples as “normal” is boring); MICHAEL WARNER, THE 
TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 787-95 (celebrating diversity in sexual practices and criticizing attempts to 
channel intimate behavior). 
35 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
36 Laura Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits, 106 MICH L REV 189 (2007); Rachel Moran, How Second-Wave 
Feminist Forgot the Single Woman, 33 HOFSTRA  L REV 223 (2004).  
37  See Edward Zelinisky, Deregulating Marriage:  The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil Marriage 
and Daniel Crane, A Judeo-Christian Argument for Privatizing Marriage,  27 CARD. L REV 1161 and 1221 
(2006) (both advocating the abolition of civil marriage). 
38 Rosenbury, supra note 36 at  221. 
39 Martha Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage: An InterSEXional Approach, 75 DEN. UNIV. L. REV. 1215, 
1216 (1998).  
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religion. That is, the state could not establish any normative family, though it could 
recognize those in existence.40   
The vast majority of this scholarship has focused on how individuals benefit when 
the state recognizes their relationships as familial.  For instance, a non-traditional parent 
who is recognized as a legal parent could receive some sort of right to visitation or 
custody and possibly some sort of right to decision-making on behalf of a child.  A non-
traditional parent could also be eligible for FMLA leave or other workplace 
discrimination protection.41  A non-traditional intimate partner who is recognized  as a 
kind of spouse could receive intestacy rights, special tax treatment and rights to own 
forms of property in common.  There are many advantages to being recognized legally as 
a family member.   
There are also obligations that accompany family status, however.  Much less of 
the scholarship has been devoted to this.  If one does secure the right to visit a child with 
whom one has developed a parent-like or significant caretaking relationship, should one 
also be held responsible for child support?  If one secures the right to FMLA protection in 
order to take care of a sick child, does one have the same legal obligations a parent does 
to care for that child after the illness?  If the state significantly de-regulates or exits the 
marriage business altogether, would financial obligations develop between parties that 
shared an intimate or interdependent relationship?  If we end marriage as the law has 
construed it, how would we know what relationship norms should be used to inform the 
content of any implicit or explicit financial agreement?   Is there such thing as a family 
                                                 
40 Alice Ristroph and Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L J 101, 135 (2010).   
41 The Family Medical Leave Act,   29 USC § 2601 et seq.   (“FMLA”) requires employers to provide up to 
12 weeks of unpaid parental leave to caretakers and prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of 
parental status.  
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relationship that does not include obligation?  Answers to these questions require some 
sort of consensus on why and how legally enforced family obligations should arise.  The 
analysis that follows reveals just how lacking that consensus may be.  
 
II. The Standardization of Family Law Obligation  
The typical domestic relations attorney spends most of his or her time considering 
what obligations family members owe each other.  There are three standard family law 
obligations, one, child support, attaching to parental status, and two, property distribution 
and alimony, attaching to marital status.  
1. Child support 
a. History 
Blackstone wrote that parents have a duty to support their children,42 but until 
well into the nineteenth century, in this country, only unwed fathers of low income 
children were subject to legal proceedings for child support. 43  Following in the tradition 
of the British Poor Laws, which allowed localities to recoup aid expended on children 
from the unwed fathers of those children, states in this country allowed governmental 
agencies to sue unwed fathers of children on aid.44   Unwed fathers of children who were 
being supported privately originally had no legal obligation to support their children.  
Gradually, in England and in most of the United States, child support obligation came to 
                                                 
42 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 446-54 (Christian ed. 1807) Blackstone 
considered the parental support to be a moral one though, not a legal one. Id. 
43 I use the term “unwed fathers” to refer to men who were not married to the mother at the time of the 
child’s birth.   
44 Donna Schuele, Origins and Development of the Law of Parental Child Support, 27 J. FAM. L. 807 at 5 
(1988-1989).   
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attach to all unwed fathers,45 but the enforcement of child support obligations against 
unwed fathers varied tremendously well into the twentieth century.   
In some states the duty to support derived from criminal liability in bastardy or 
fornication.46  Some states only imposed parental obligation on unwed fathers who 
voluntarily acknowledged paternity.47  At least one state developed a separate code 
setting a separate defined amount of support owed by the father of an illegitimate child.48  
It was not until 1972 that Texas and Idaho were willing to impose any child support 
obligation on unwed fathers.  
The plight of divorced fathers was different.  Until the mid-nineteenth century, 
divorcing fathers received custody of their children so child support was not an issue. The 
support duty followed the custody.49   As the nineteenth century progressed, courts began 
to afford mothers custody, though only if mothers could prove they (or their families) 
could adequately support the child. 50  Once mothers began receiving custody more 
regularly, maternal custody became the norm and the idea that a divorced non-custodial 
parent might have a duty to support his child emerged as salient. What probably swayed 
courts most toward holding noncustodial fathers responsible for some measure of child 
                                                 
45 In England, unwed finally mothers secured the right to sue the father of a child for child support, 
regardless of whether the child was receiving state aid, in 1844.  LAWRENCE P. HAMPTON, DISPUTED 
PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS, sec. 1.02(1)-(3) 
46  HARRY D KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY:  LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY at 109 (1971). 
47 See VA CODE ANN Sec. 20-61 (1950)  
48  FLA STAT ANN SEC 48-7-4 (1966).  
49 See Leslie Harris, Dennis Waldrop and Lori Waldrop, Making and Breaking Connections Between 
Parents’ Duty to Support and Right to Control Their Children, 69 OR. L. REV. 689 (1990).  Some state 
courts, following Blackstone, held that the parental duty to support was a moral one that could not be 
legally enforced. See BLACKSTONE,  supra note 42.Other state courts held that parents were legally 
responsible for supporting their children, but that duty was derivative of the parent’s right to control their 
children, including their children’s labor. See Harris, Waldrop and Waldrop, supra at 690.  Because fathers 
were presumptively entitled to custody and control, see Schuele, supra note 44 at 2, there was little need for 
one parent to ever ask a court to enforce a duty of parental support against another. 
50 Schuele, supra  note 44 at 2.  
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support was the judgment of marital fault.51  Mothers successfully argued that a father 
should not be able to use his own culpable marital behavior as an excuse for not 
supporting his children. Thus, where mothers could prove that that the husband’s 
behavior was responsible for marital breakdown, courts were more likely to hold fathers 
responsible for some specific amount of child support.52 
By the late nineteenth century, most state divorce codes gave courts authority to 
hold noncustodial parents responsible for child support to an ex-spouse, but those statutes 
also gave courts wide discretion in whether and how to do so.53  Courts often labeled the 
divorce award “alimony” without signifying what portion was meant as spousal support 
and what was meant as child support.54  If the award was high enough, reviewing courts 
would presume it was meant to include care for children.55  With so little consensus on 
why fathers should be responsible for child support and with so much variation in the 
degree of culpability different fathers might be thought to have for marital break-up, it is 
hardly surprising that child support awards varied so tremendously.  
b. Reform 
                                                 
51 Id. at 5.   
52 Enforcing this duty was still exceedingly difficult, however.  Courts were barred from ordering payments 
into the future so mothers could only bring actions for past support not paid.  And when mothers did that, 
they were barred from statutes of limitations from arguing for more arrearages that had accumulated over 
the course of many years.   For the most part, mothers simply did not bring these actions.  If obligors were 
delinquent, there was not much obligees could do.  The important point is that by the mid- nineteenth 
century courts were willing to conceptualize a child support duty for a non-custodial parent.  But if that 
duty could not be discharged in a lump sum payment at the time of divorce, it might never be collected.  
See id. at 9. 
53 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS VOL 2, §95 at 192 (1936).  
54 Schuele, supra note 44 at 7. 
55 Id.  
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As divorce rates rose – which they did continually from the mid nineteenth 
century until the late 1970s56 – child support law became ever more important. New 
theories of child well-being encouraged judges to make custody determinations more 
child-centered.  The “best interest of the child” standard replaced the maternal preference 
standard for custody.57  The need to think about the particularities of the child for custody 
purposes probably led courts to be more careful in distinguishing between child support 
and alimony. 58   Children’s needs began to be viewed as paramount.  
The 1970s also saw an almost complete overhaul of divorce law nationwide.  
Marriage was no longer conceptualized as permanent; both men and women were 
expected to be able to take care of their own needs; blame was supposed to be banished 
from the marital dissolution discourse.   As will be discussed more fully below, these 
theoretical changes in the basic legal understanding of marriage required fundamental 
changes in the law of marital obligation.  No-fault divorce became available almost 
everywhere.   Statutes regarding property distribution and alimony were altered to try to 
reflect a more modern version of marriage and divorce. Alimony was discouraged. 
Not much changed with regard to child support though. Most statutes continued to 
give judges wide discretion to award whatever child support amount they saw fit.  The 
statutes suggested that the judges consider the needs of the child and the wealth of the 
                                                 
56ELLMAN, KURTZ, SCOTT, EITHORN AND BIX. FAMILY LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS, at 234-35 (4th ed., 
Lexis Nexis 2004) (hereinafter ELLMAN, KURTZ) (graph showing proportion of marriage entered that end in 
divorce by year, starting in 1867 and ending in 1985). 
57 LESLIE HARRIS, LEE TEITLELBAUM, JUNE CARBONE, FAMILY LAW, at 585 (4th ed., Aspen Publishers 
2010)  (hereinafter HARRIS, TEITELBAUM, CARBONE) .  
58  Since at least the mid 20th century there has also been notorious interplay between alimony and child 
support for tax reasons.  Because alimony is tax deductible and child support is not, separating parties had 
every incentive to label to bulk of any settlement alimony, not child support.  The IRS designed rules to 
curb this practice, but it probably still continues. See HARRIS, TEITELBAUM AND CARBONE, supra note 57 at 
569. 
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parents and the marital standard of living, but there was little guidance beyond that and 
awards varied tremendously.59  
It was the federal government, not family law judges or state code drafters, that 
finally put some limits on discretionary child support awards.   Congress, like the drafters 
of the British Poor Laws centuries before, was concerned about securing more private 
funds for low income children so that those children would be less of a financial burden 
on the government.  Using the spending power, Congress passed The Federal Child 
Support Act of 1984, which required all states to draft specific guidelines for child 
support purposes,60 and The Family Support Act of 1988, which required that those 
guidelines create a rebuttable presumption of obligation.61  The federal regulations 
interpreting those Acts, which have been in place since 1989, require states to use 
“numeric guidelines” that take into account “all earnings of and income of the non-
custodial parent” and “economic data on the cost of raising children.”62  As one of the 
leading casebooks in family law comments, the term “guideline” is a misnomer.  
“’Formulas’” and ‘tables,’ along with many presumptive rules, are more accurate 
descriptions of the numeric algorithms that now govern child support.63    
None of the formulas actually use what the statute explicitly requires, “economic 
data on the cost of raising children,”  for two reasons.  First, there is no economic data on 
cost.  No one has ever collected it.  Second, and related to the first, cost data would 
require quintessentially subjective value judgments.   In order to determine the cost of an 
                                                 
59 Nancy Thoennes et al., The Impact of Child-Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy, Award Availability 
and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM. L. Q. 325, 326 (1991) (citing studies). 
60 42 USC § § 666-667 (2000). 
61 Pub. L. 100-485, 42 USC §667(b) (2000). 
62  45 CFR § 302.56(c)(l),(h).  
63 SEE ELLMAN, KURTZ, supra note 56 at 460.  
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expense, one needs to define the contours of the expense, so as to include in the cost 
figure everything that goes into that expense.  If the expense is defined as “raising a 
child,” the determination of cost cannot be determined neutrally.   What kind and how 
much food, clothing, enrichment, education and recreation does a child need, deserve or 
benefit from?  Millions of different parents answer those questions differently every day.    
The guidelines rely instead on expenditure data.  The expenditure data tries to 
capture average marginal expenditures on children at different income levels.  How much 
does the average two-parent household that earns $20,000 annually spend on one child?  
How much does that household spend on two children?  How much does the average 
two-parent household that earns $60,000 spend on one child, two children etc.  To derive 
the expenditure data, economists use equivalence scales that measure standards of living 
based on adult expenditures.  For instance, if a childless couple earning $60,000 a year 
spends the same amount on adult goods as a two child family earning $90,000 a year, the 
equivalence scale suggests that the marginal cost of two children at the $90,000  income 
level is $30,000.64  Guidelines are designed to reflect those marginal costs at different 
income levels.   The goal is for the custodial household to be able to spend the same 
amount on children that it would spend if the parents lived together.65  
Most states currently use one of two formulas to determine parental obligation 
with this data.  The majority of states use the “income shares” model, which combines 
the two parents’ incomes, looks to the marginal expenditure figure for that income level, 
and then divides responsibility for that amount between the parents in proportion to their 
total contribution to the joint income figure. For instance, a non-custodial parent would 
                                                 
64 Ira Ellman, Fudging Failure:  The Economic Analysis Used to Construct Child Support Guidelines, 2004 
U CHI L FORUM 167, 190.  
65 There are numerous problems with the expenditure figure that will be addressed in Part III.  
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pay the custodial parent half of the marginal expenditure amount for their income level if 
both parents earned the same amount.  A non-custodial sole earner parent would pay the 
entire marginal expenditure amount.   Approximately 19 states use the “percentage of 
obligor income” (“POOI”) formula.  Under this approach, the obligor pays a percentage 
of his income based on the number of children at issue (20% for one child, 25% for two 
children etc.)  The formula bases the percentages on the same marginal expenditure data 
so the awards are often comparable.66   
As Part III will detail, there are numerous theoretical problems with these 
formulas and though seemingly neutral, they are packed with value judgments about 
which there is likely significant disagreement.  But the guidelines are remarkably non-
controversial.67  Judges use them regularly. They render predictable results.  Litigants do 
not challenge them.  Whether in mediation or pre-litigation, settling parties routinely 
agree on child support amounts that are consistent with the guidelines.68  The guidelines 
apply to anyone who is considered a parent.69 
2. Property Division  
a. History 
                                                 
66 As an example, assume that each parent makes $50,000 a year and the marginal child expenditure figure 
for a child in a $100,000 household is $20,000.  Under an income shares formula, because the obligor earns 
50% of the total parental income, he would pay 50% of the marginal expenditure figure, or $10,000.   
Under a POOI formula, the obligor would pay 20% of his income, or (again), $10,000. 
67 The ALI Principles have proposed new guidelines that build on the old ones, but the ALI’s proposal 
ignores many of the deepest theoretical flaws with the guideline structure. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.06 – 3.16 
(2002) (hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES) and infra Part IIIA.   
68 M. Marcus, W Marcus, N Stilwell and N Doherty, To Mediate or Not To Mediate:  Financial Outcomes 
in Mediated Versus Adversarial Divorces, 17 MEDIATION QUARTERLY 143-151 (1999) (No significant 
difference in litigated versus mediated divorces.)  
69 At high income levels, courts sometimes stray from the guidelines on the theory that no child needs 23% 
of a very, very wealthy parent’s yearly income, but departure from the guidelines at high income levels has 
also been criticized soundly criticized.  See Larua Raajtes, High-Income Child Support Guidelines:  
Harmonizing the Need for Limits with the Best Interest of the Child,  86 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 317 (2011).  
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Property distribution rules apply whenever a married couple gets divorced. Unlike 
the law of child support, the traditional law of property division was not tremendously 
discretionary.  In community property states (8 states, mostly in the American West, that 
adopted continental European traditions),70 husband and wife were perceived as joint 
owners of all marital property.71    At divorce, marital property was divided between the 
parties.72  Most community property states had very limited, if any, alimony provisions.   
An ex-wife’s post-divorce needs were to be met, to the extent they could be met, by her 
property allocation and her property allocation was set at one half of the marital estate.  
The idea of marital property was an anathema in most of the United States, 
however.  The majority of states in the United States adopted the English common law 
system of title.73  At divorce, whoever had title to property received the property.74    This 
too was a bright line rule, and could be very harsh on divorcing women.  At divorce, 
married women could receive only the property that they brought into the marriage – 
though if a husband had squandered the property during the marriage, the wife had little 
remedy.  Married women were prohibited from owning property until the mid-19th 
                                                 
70 There are nine community property states now.  They are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin.  Wisconsin was the latecomer to the regime, switching to 
community property laws in 1983.   
71 Property earned by either spouse was usually considered marital, but inheritances and property brought 
into the marriage usually was not considered marital.  
72 Community property states do not necessarily divide community property equally at divorce.  Some 
states have provisions requiring an equal division of property, but most permit an equitable division.  See 
THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY, Distribution of Property, 
§3.03[5].   
73 For an explanation of how the parallel property regimes originally developed in Europe, see Charles 
Donahue Jr., What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas?  Marital Property in England and France in the 
Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH L REV 59 (1980) .  
74  There was some variation across time.  Southern states did not even recognize judicial divorce until after 
the Civil War.  Most northern states initially only recognized divorce mensa et thoro, which technically 
means legal separation.  It was in that system that the idea of alimony developed as support in a 
relationship that had not officially ended.  Once the common law states started recognized complete 
divorce, most retained the system that had been used with divorce mensa et thoro, property went to the 
husband and support went to the wife.      
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century and even after passage of the Married Women’s Property Acts, women rarely 
acquired anything other than inheritance during a marriage.75  At divorce, women were 
entitled to anything titled in their name, but there was usually very little titled in their 
name.     
Courts in common law jurisdictions had authority to order support or alimony 
from a husband to a wife with little property, but there was little to no consensus on what 
that award should represent.  The amounts varied tremendously and they were usually 
tied to the degree of culpability found in the divorcing husband.  The wife was thought 
entitled to alimony because the husband was responsible for the marital dissolution.  
 
 b. Reform 
The national movement to eliminate, or at least provide alternatives to, fault-
based divorce started in earnest in the 1960s and had achieved tremendous success by the 
mid 1970s.  All states but one enacted legislation providing for divorce in cases of 
“irreconcilable differences.”76   But by destroying fault-based divorce, reformers77 also 
destroyed much of the theory governing financial disentanglement at divorce in title-
based jurisdictions.  In its stead, reformers adopted a system of “equitable distribution.”  
Borrowing the concept of marital property from the community property states, the new 
statutes instructed judges to treat property acquired during the marriage as “marital 
                                                 
75 HARRIS, TEITELBAUM AND CARBONE, supra ntoe 57 at 38-39. 
76 This is the standard statutory justification for allowing two people to divorce in the absence of fault.  
New York was a hold out state and only recently adopted no-fault divorce protocols.  See Paterson Signs 
No-Fault Divorce Bill, nytimes.com/2010/08/16/nyregion/16divorce.html  
77  The reformers during this period included lawyers, judges, academics and politicians.  See  J. Herbie 
DiFonzo, No-Fault Marital Dissolution:  The Bitter Triumph of Naked Divorce, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 519 
(1994) (describing the assorted cast of characters that played a role in moving states toward no-fault 
divorce laws.) 
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property” and to divide that property “equitably” between the divorcing spouses, 
regardless of who held title. 78    Equitable jurisdiction statutes typically provided judges 
with a long list of factors that might be considered relevant to an equitable distribution of 
property.79   It was at this point that the law of property distribution became wildly 
unpredictable.   
The statutes provided for “equitable” distribution not “equal” distribution of 
assets in part to allow judges to distribute property in such a way as to effectuate a kind 
of lasting fairness between the parties.   Judges were given discretion to determine what 
an “equitable” distribution of property should be.  In theory this allowed judges to award 
more property to the spouse with less earning capacity as a way of trying to lessen the 
differential in post-divorce standard of living.  But this rarely happened.  Some judges 
maintained an allegiance to title-based rules, possibly because statutes often offered such 
a long list of often contradictory factors that judges were left with no guidance.   Other 
judges just applied whichever factors seemed to them most compelling.80    
Gradually, though, courts have reached consensus on an understanding of 
equitable. It means equal – usually.  Over time, relying in part on norms from some 
community property states, in part on various theories of partnership and promise, but 
also just craving a baseline from which to operate, most states have developed 
                                                 
78 A few common law states did not adopt a system of marital property and instead gave courts authority to 
consider all property, however and whenever acquired, in deciding on an equitable distribution.  See 
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307.  These states are known as “hotchpot” states because the 
judge can throw all property into the hotchpot and then divide it up.   
79  See i.e., Illinois Marriage and Divorce Act, 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(1)-(12) (listing 12 factors for courts to 
consider when distributing property). 
80 See Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980s, 44 LA L. REV 1553, 1556 (1984) (describing 
how equitable distribution system left divorcing litigants “in a lottery whose outcome greatly depend(ed) 
on the luck of the judicial draw.”).  
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presumptions or starting points of a 50/50 split.  Six states codify the 50/50 division 
presumption in their statute, but many, many more have adopted the rules judicially. 81 
  How easy it is to depart from the 50/50 presumption may depend on how much 
is considered marital property.  Those states willing to consider all property, however and 
whenever acquired, as subject to division, are more willing to deviate from the 50/50 
presumption in order to award more at dissolution to the person who came into the 
marriage with significantly more property.  But there is striking conformity around the 
idea that all property produced by marital labor, that is, the labor of either spouse during 
the marriage, should be split equally at divorce.  The ALI Principles explicitly adopt this 
principle.82 
To be sure, there is still considerable squabbling about what counts as marital 
property.  Marital labor can produce many forms of property that are difficult to value at 
the time of divorce (stock options, retirement accounts, disability awards, for instance).    
But what has emerged as a reliable constant is that the property that marital labor has 
produced should be divided equally.83  Some high-profile, high-end divorces suggest that 
at levels of extreme wealth,84 courts balk at a fully equal division, but other high-end 
                                                 
81    Arkansas, Indiana, New Hampshire, California, Louisiana and New Mexico have all codified the 50/50 
presumption.  Many other states use the 50/50 rule as either a presumption or a starting point.  These 
include Indiana, Nevada, North Carolina Oregon, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Illinois, Delaware, Iowa, 
Maine, Montana and New Jersey.  Empirical work suggests that still other courts use a 50-50 rule without 
any guidance telling them to do so.  As Marsha Garrison has noted, “[j]udges thus appear to gravitate 
strongly toward an equal division norm even in states that have no statutory or case law preferring such an 
outcome.”  Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce:  Would Adoption of the ALI 
Principles Imporve Current Outcomes? 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 119, 124 (2001).  
82 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 67 at §4.09. (“[M]arital property and marital debts are divided at dissolution 
so that the spouses receive net shared equal in value, although not necessarily identical in kind.”)  
83 Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony:  The Division of Property to 
Address Need, 56 Fordham L Rev 827 (1988) (finding that most equitable division statutes result in 
approximately equal division of property).  
84 See Wendt v. Wendt, 706 A 2d 1021 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996). 
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cases suggest that judges have become fully comfortable with the idea of a 50/50 split.85  
The more comfortable judges are with the equal divide, the more ordinary it becomes and 
the more the vast majority of divorcing parties, who never actually get to a courtroom, 
divide equally the property that either’s marital labor has produced.86 
3. Alimony/Maintenance 
a. History and Reform 
When marriages were meant to last forever and when they were only terminated 
because one person violated the marital bargain, the law understood what alimony was. It 
was the payment of an on-going obligation of support to the innocent spouse.  Because 
the husband was the only spouse with a duty to support, he was the only one who could 
be charged with alimony.87  In the early days of marriage in this country, some courts 
even adopted a theory for determining the amount of alimony.  Women entitled to 
alimony were entitled to their dower amount, or what they would have gotten had their 
husband died - roughly 1/3 of the husband’s property.88 If the husband was not at fault, 
the wifes’s chances of securing alimony were remote.   
When fault was banished – or at least mostly banished89 – from the marital 
dissolution discourse, reformers struggled with a justification for alimony.  
                                                 
85 Polsky v. Polsky, 2008 W L 5062805 (Ill. App. Dis. 2008) (affirming trial court’s straight equal divide of 
couple’s property). 
86  Marcus, Marcus, Stilwell and. Doherty,  supra  note 68 at 151 (1999)  (“our results indicate that most 
financial outcomes of mediated versus adversarial divorce formats are not significantly different”).  
87 The Supreme Court struck down gendered alimony statutes in 1979, Orr v. Orr, 440 US 268 (1979).  All 
states now have provisions for awarding alimony to either a man or woman.  
88   June Carbone, Futility of Coherence, 4 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 46 (2002).   It does not appear that the 
1/3 figure, or the theory underlying it, survived into the 20th century.   It certainly is not referenced by 20th 
century courts.   
89 Many states that adopted no-fault divorce, retained fault-based provisions for parties that preferred to sue 
for fault.  See Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(1).  Moreover, fault or 
culpability determinations routinely find their way into judicial decisions, regardless of whether they are 
acknowledged as such.  See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Money as Emotion in the Distribution of Wealth at 
Divorce, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTES’ PRINCIPLES 
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Accompanying the move to no-fault were also (i) a growing belief that women should be 
able to provide for themselves and (ii) a desire to let the parties go their separate ways 
after divorce.  Accordingly, many statutes, including the Uniform Marriage and Divorce 
Act, favored the elimination of alimony altogether.90   For situations in which that seemed 
too harsh, most statutes gave courts the authority to award what a dependent spouse 
needed and/or what was necessary for her to rehabilitate herself to an appropriate level of 
self-sufficiency.91 
The problems with both the need and rehabilitation standards soon became 
manifest.  “Need,” referred to in the abstract, gives judges no baseline. What is need to be 
determined in reference to?  Few judges were willing to let previously middle-class 
divorced wives sink to just above the poverty level, but using alimony (or “maintenance,” 
as it came to be called) to allow her to remain at the marital standard of living imposed 
too great a burden on the obligor.  Both spouses could not maintain the same standard of 
living unless there was considerable unused excess generated during the marriage.  Thus, 
judges were left to assess their own sense of need and the awards varied widely between 
the extremes of poverty and the marital standard of living.92  
The rehabilitation standard suffered from a comparable problem.  Even if an 
obligor spouse could be held responsible for paying for his ex-spouse to “rehabilitate” 
herself into self-sufficiency, what level of self-sufficiency is appropriate?  For instance, a 
teacher who left the workforce to raise her children might be able to re-activate her 
                                                                                                                                                 
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, at 240 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006)  (hereinafter 
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY);  Carbone, supra note 88 at  55.  
90 Cynthia Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1513, 
1539 (April, 2005).  
91 Katharine K. Baker, Contracting for Security: Paying Married Women What They’ve Earned, 55 U CHI L 
REV 1193, 1200 (1998).        
92 ELLMAN, KURTZ supra note 56 at 364 (describing variation) 
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teacher’s license, but if she was married to a doctor or lawyer, her standard of living after 
divorce would still fall substantially. Should that matter?    Some judges said yes. Some 
said no.  There was very little way to predict.  
The empirical work done on alimony suggests that the reforms of the 1970s 
decreased the frequency of alimony awards,93 but judges soon grew wary of relying on 
either need or rehabilitation theories to award maintenance, particularly in long-term 
marriages.  The results just seemed too punitive.  The judicial desire to award more was 
bolstered by a cottage industry of scholarly commentary that strained to explain why 
courts should award more.94  Usually these theories suggested that alimony payments be 
based on some notion of marital contribution,95 foregone opportunities96 or partnership 
theory.97  Some scholars suggested that the post-divorce standards of living in the two 
households should be equal.98  By the 1990s, many courts were using some or all of these 
theories to give more generous alimony awards in long term marriages.  
Still, all commentators would agree that alimony remains the least coherent and 
most discretionary area of family obligation.   Compensating an ex-spouse for the 
contributions she made to the household makes sense, but the market value for those 
domestic services is often quite low and many household contributions (attending a 
                                                 
93 Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce:  Changing Rules, Changing Results in DIVORCE REFORM 
AT THE CROSSROADS, at 75, 84 (Sugarman and Kay, eds. 1991); How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases, 74 
N.C. L. REV. 401 (1996) (alimony only awarded in 15% of all divorces).  
94  Ira Ellman, The Making of Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 801, 810 (discussing the “burst of academic 
writing” about policy rationales for maintenance). 
95 HARRIS, TEITELBAUM, AND CARBONE, supra note 57 at 345 (5th ed. 2010).   
96 Ira Ellman, A Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 17 (Jan. 1989).   
97  Starnes, supra note 90 at 108.   
98 This theory is fairly popular among academics concerned about the consistently gendered nature of 
household work, see JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER  (2000), Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: 
Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L REV 539 562-63 (1990), but few courts have been 
willing to impose something like this.  For an exception see, Clapp v. Clapp, 653 A.2d. 72 (Vermont, 
1994).  
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child’s school play, helping an elderly parent, organizing a family vacation) simply have 
no market value.99  Compensating for foregone opportunities also makes sense, but the 
longer the marriage, the more impossible it becomes to determine the contours of what 
one spouse gave up for the other.  Should the law assume that the spouse who decided not 
to pursue a PhD because she got married would have pursued it otherwise?   How should 
it decide that?  Should the woman who dropped off partnership track after her second 
child be compensated as if she had made partner?  What if she was on track to make more 
than her husband, but the couple decided together that they would rather have the 
husband be the primary wage-earner?  What if the decision was hers alone and he would 
have preferred that she worked?100  
Partnership theory is also problematic for alimony theory because when 
partnerships dissolve the partners do not have any on-going obligation to each other – 
unless it is clearly laid out in the partnership agreement.  Alimony involves claims to 
future earning capacity.  When marriage was supposed to be permanent, it made sense to 
give an ex-spouse a share of the other’s future earning capacity.  If marriage is no longer 
meant to be permanent, what justifies giving a spouse any share of the future earning 
capacity?  The reformers of the 1970s seemed happy enough with an answer of “nothing” 
or “very little.”  Judges proved unwilling to impose that answer on women in longer term 
marriages.  Somehow, their status as a wife entitled them to something more than just 
                                                 
99 Katharine K. Baker, The Problem with Unpaid Work, 4 U. OF ST. THOM. L. REV. 599, 613-614 (2007) 
(describing unpaid work for which there are no market alternatives).  
100 The question in these cases is not the same as in a tort case in which the jury is asked to assess how 
much a plaintiff would have earned given the choices she had made before she got hurt.  The question for 
rehabilitative alimony is how much would this ex-spouse have earned if she had made different life  
choices.  
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what they needed or what they might use to piece together an alternative life at age 45 or 
50.   
A consensus of sorts is emerging though.  Legislatures are increasingly 
prohibiting alimony in shorter marriages, while lawyers and judges are promulgating 
guidelines for longer term marriages.    Texas and California prohibit alimony in 
marriages of less than 10 years and several states set a maximum number of months for 
alimony. 101  Meanwhile, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers developed 
guidelines for alimony after concluding that there were two significant and related 
problems with spousal support, “lack of consistency resulting in a perception of 
unfairness” and “inability to accurately predict an outcome in any given case.”102    
Supreme Courts in Pennsylvania, Georgia and Nevada have recommended the adoption 
of spousal support guidelines.103 Counties in Arizona, California, New Mexico, Kansas, 
Michigan, Virginia, Nevada, Oregon and Pennsylvania have all developed formulas or 
guidelines that provide at least a starting point for an alimony award.104   Various judges 
in Massachusetts, on their own, developed numerical formula, based on their past 
decisions, that they use as guides for future decisions.105   
Possibly most influentially, the ALI Principles recommend an alimony formula, 
which they base on a theory of “spousal compensation,” and which like all of the 
guidelines just discussed, consider two different variables, income of the spouses and 
                                                 
101 J. Thomas Oldham, Changes in the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 1958-2008, 42 FAM. L. Q. 424, 
432 (2008).  
102 Report of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers on Considerations When Determining 
Alimony, Spousal Support or Maintenances Approved by Board of Governors, March 9, 2007.    
103  An Update on Florida Alimony Case Law: Are Alimony Guidelines a Part of Our Future?, FLORIDA 
BAR JOURNAL, November 1, 2003  
104 Mary Kay Kisthardt, Re-thinking Alimony:  The AAML’s Consideration for Calculating Alimony, 
Spousal Support or Maintenance, 21 J AMER. ACAD. OF  MATRIM. LAWYERS 61, 73-77 (2008). 
105 Scott Stevenson and Justin Kelsey, The Divorce Spousal Support Calculator:  An Alimony Formula 
Resource (Revised Feb. 12, 2010)  (describing the different formula used by Massachusetts judges). 
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duration of the marriage.106  If the income differential is significant enough and the 
marriage lasted long enough, the guidelines provide a set of multipliers for determining 
alimony. The amount is a function of the income of the parties. The duration is a function 
of the length of the marriage.  
4. Summary 
Together, these various formulas for child support, property distribution and 
alimony leave little for the law, or anyone, to contextualize when family forms are 
altered.  For instance, a father of one who is getting divorced after a 15 year marriage in 
which he was the primary breadwinner will owe some readily discernible amount of child 
support (20-25% of his income), half the value of any property that he acquired by his 
own labor during the marriage and probably some readily discernable amount of 
temporary alimony if the future income differential between himself and his spouse is 
substantial.  There is no reason for this hypothetical father to go to court because a 
judge’s job would be to apply the same formulae that anyone with an ability to read a 
statute could apply.   
But consider who else need not go to court.  The man who never wanted a child, 
never lived with the child’s mother, never functioned as a father, but had a sexual 
relationship that resulted in pregnancy would owe the exact same amount of child support 
as the first father (assuming he earned the same amount) in child support.   A man who 
came into a mother’s life after a child was born (or maybe even before), lived with and 
provided for the child, and functioned as a father, would owe nothing if a legal father 
existed elsewhere.   It is the status of fatherhood that matters.  
                                                 
106 Kirsthardt, supra note 104 at 78. 
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A husband whose wife spent an entire childless marriage in graduate school only 
to decide she was not sure that she cared about a graduate degree and wanted instead to 
become a painter, must divide any property he earned during their marriage in the exact 
same manner as the husband whose wife mothered 3 children, decorated their home, 
cooked all the meals, tended to his parents, coached 4 sports teams and ran the PTA.  It is 
the status of marriage that determines whether the proceeds of marital labor must be 
shared equally.  Comparably it is the length of the marital status and the earning 
differential between the spouses, not the particularities of the marriage that determine an 
alimony obligation.   The next section probes those obligations even further.   
III.  The Formulas Critiqued 
A. Child Support 
As just described, legal parents of children may owe or receive child support 
payments.  In 2009, $31.7 billion was transferred in child support.107  The total amount of 
arrearages for previous years was over $107 billion.108  Estimates suggest that thirty 
percent of the United States’ adult population probably was or is a payor or payee of 
child support.109  Child support is big business. Yet the underlining methodology used to 
established those  billions of dollars in child support liability is based on highly suspect 
data, woefully outdated assumptions about family norms, and contested understandings 
of appropriate duties. 
As those who work closely with the guidelines are well aware, the average 
marginal expenditure figures that form the core of the guideline obligation structure are 
                                                 
107 Figure 6, US Dept of Health and Human Services, Office of Child Support Enforcement FY 2009 
Preliminary Report, http//www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2010/reports/preliminary_report_fy2009. 
108 Id. at 2. 
109Ira Mark Ellman and Tara O’Toole Ellman, The Theory of Child Support, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 107, 
121-123 (2008). 
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deeply flawed.110  To highlight just the most obvious flaws, the guidelines use average 
data and there is strong reason to believe that because so many individuals have such 
different ideas about when, why and how one should spend money on children, there is 
huge variation around the mean.111  Attention to context would demand attention to those 
differences. 
The guidelines also rely on marginal data, probably either because  (i) economists 
are used to relying on marginal data or (ii) the guideline drafters want to preference the 
interest of the non-residential parent.  The first explanation for using marginal data is just 
silly,112 but the second is not well justified either.  Marginal data tells us how much more 
a two-adult household may need to spend to maintain the same standard of living once a 
child arrives, but it tells us nothing about the average cost or expenditures of  a one parent 
household with a child.  The marginal expenditure figure ignores both the economies of 
scale reaped by two adults living together and the joint consumption that inevitably 
follows when a parent lives with a child.113  What it captures is what one parent, who was 
living with the other parent, would have expected to pay in added costs once a child 
                                                 
110 Professor Ira Ellman has written extensively about the problems with the child support formulas. See 
Id.;  Ellman, supra note 64,  Ellman, supra  note 94 and Ira Mark Ellman, Inventing Family Law, 32 UC 
DAVIS L REv 855 (1999)..   Professor Grace Blumberg was the reporter who worked most closely with the 
ALI Principles re-formulation of child support guidelines.  Id.  Both scholars readily acknowledge the 
limitations of the marginal expenditure figure.   
111 See Laurie J Bassi and Burt S Barnow, Expenditures on Children and Child Support Guidelines, 12 J 
POL ANAL. AND MANAGEMENT 478, 486 (1993) (suggesting that one needs a spread of 21 percentage points 
to capture 80% of the families around the mean). 
112 Ira Ellman suggested that that the use of marginal numbers may simply be the result of economists 
acting pursuant to the standard economic question, whether the marginal cost of one more widget is less 
than the economic benefit.  But, as Ellman, notes, one parent post-dissolution households are “like a new 
entr[ies] into the widget business. They are start-ups.” See Ellman, supra note 64 at 187.  As such, they 
need to consider all costs associated with a one parent household, not just the marginal costs associated 
with a two parent household.   
113 For instance, a child may not produce the need for another car in a 2 adult household with one car, but 
the existence of a child may necessitate a car in a single parent household.  Likewise, the existence of a 
child may not raise the cost of heating or cooling a 2 bedroom apartment, but the custodial parent who lives 
with a child in a two bedroom apartment should arguably be entitled to child support payments that help 
pay for the heat and air conditioning the child needs.  The marginal figure ignores those costs. 
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arrived.   As the comments to the ALI Principles state, this “most frequent measure of 
American child support is better understood as an expression of the interests of the 
nonresidential parents.”114   
The deference to non-residential parents has been explained and partly defended 
as reflecting the “intuitive” understanding that each individual has the first claim to his 
own income.115   “The higher income parents, whether a residential or nonresidential 
parent, has an interest in benefiting disproportionately as compared to other family 
members from the fruits of his or her own labor.”116  A nonresidential parent certainly 
does have that interest, but the extent to which that interest should trump the interests of 
the child or the residential parent may depend a great deal on context and the 
interdependencies that have or have not developed.   
Finally, the expenditure figures on which the formulas rely are based on the 
notion that we can generate accurate equivalence scales for determining when two 
households with a different number of inhabitants experience the same standard of living.  
Do two household that spend the same amount on adult clothing really share the same 
standard of living?  The equivalence scales presume that they do.117  Professor Ira 
Ellman, who has done more than anyone to highlight the flaws in child support 
methodology, summarizes the use of equivalence scales as “empirically unverifiable, 
theoretically questionable, and . . . [based on] . . . flawed data.”118  In short, there are 
                                                 
114 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 67,§3.04,  Comment e., p 427.   
115 Professor Ellman has explored this principle in at least two works,  Ellman and  Ellman, supra  note 109 
at 121-123 (2008) and Ira Mark Ellman, Sanford Braver and Robert MacCoun, Intuitive Lawmaking:  The 
Example of Child Support, 6 J OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1 (2009).   
116 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 67, §3.04, Comment d., p 425 
117 Ellman, supra note 64 at 215 
118 Id. The Equivalence scales assume that one can make reliable assessments on spending patterns by 
looking at only a selected few kinds of expenditures.  Most scales use adult expenditures on clothing to 
assess standards of living in two adult households.  Two households that spend the same amount of money 
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loads of reasons to question the implicit policy choices upon which the guidelines are 
based.  The ALI Principles try to address some of these problems by introducing a 
measure that helps ensure that a child’s standard of living will not be “grossly inferior to 
that of either parent.”119  But the base measure used by the ALI still relies on average 
marginal expenditure data and, more fundamentally, takes as its primary interest the idea 
that a child “is to be economically unharmed by family dissolution.”120   But for a family 
to have dissolved, it had to exist in the first place.  What is or was the child’s family and 
why should the law consider it dissolved?   
1. What Family?  
Recall the demographic data above. Forty percent of children in this country are 
born to unmarried mothers.  Less than half of those are born to cohabiting couples 
(meaning the parents actually share a household) and half of the children born to 
cohabiting couples see their household split by age 9.  25% of children born to married 
couples see their household split by age 9.  Thus 20% of children never live in the two 
parent home upon which the econometric model is based and another 25% see that home 
dissolve before age 9.  Another substantial percentage of children have their two parent 
                                                                                                                                                 
on adult clothing are thought to have the same standard of living.  As Ellman details, see id. at 210-216, the 
methodology used to generate these results are unverifiable.  The notion that one can make such grand 
conclusions from adult clothing data alone is suspect, and the results are known to underreport income in 
low income households and underreport expenditures in high income households.  In practice, this makes it 
seem as if low income groups pay a greater percentage of their income on children than they actually do 
and as if high income groups spend less on their children then they actually do.  
119  See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 67, § 3.05(3)(b).  The current guidelines, whether “income shares” or 
“POOI,” do an adequate job of ensuring comparable standards of living in both the custodial and non-
custodial household if the custodial and non-custodial parent have comparable amounts of income.  
Unfortunately, this is very often not the case so stark standard of living disparities between custodial and 
noncustodial households are common.  See Thomas Oldman, Appropriate Child Support Award when the 
Noncustodial Parent Earns Less than the Custodial Parent, 31 HOU. L. REV. 585, 598 (1994-1995).  
120 ALI PRINCIPLES , supra note 67, §3.04 Comment c., p. 424. 
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household dissolve after age 9.  Yet that hypothetical two parent household serves as the 
basis of all child support obligation.  
Many unmarried women have children while still living with their own parent(s).  
Part of the reason these women do not live on their own is because neither they nor the 
men with whom they have children can afford a home on their own.121  The child support 
model assumes that home exists. Why should the model be based on an ideal that is 
beyond the reach and/or not desirable for so many parents?  
As indicated earlier, most of the children who do not spend their childhoods living 
with both of their parents live with and/or are cared for by other adults.   One-third of all 
children spend some time before age 18 in step-families.122  Step-parents often bring new 
children into the household or have obligations to children outside the household.   
Should either the composition of the new household or the existence of another one affect 
the obligation of child support payors?  Who should the payor be?  Why is the first – 
often hypothetical – household the only one to determine child support obligation?  
Attention to context would require incorporating different living situations into obligation 
determinations.123 
2. Multiple Parents ? 
                                                 
121 See Judith Stacey, In the Name of the Family: Rethinking Family Values in the Postmodern Age 30, 40-
45 (1996) (discussing inability of low income and working class men to support a household); Kathryn 
Edin & Laura Lein, Making Ends Meet:  How Single Mothers Survive Welfare and Low-Wage Work, at 58-
64 (1997).  
122 Larry L Bumpass et al., The Changing Character of  Stepfamilies:  Implications of Cohabitation and 
Nonmarital Childbearing, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 425 (1995) (this figure includes the children of split cohabiting 
couples as well as the children of divorced couples, and counts as step-parents any partner of the child’s 
primary parent who lives in the household).  
123 Some courts do take pre-existing obligations into account when setting child support amounts, but the 
trend is away from doing so. Leslie Harris, The ALI Child Support Principles: Incremental Changes to 
Improve the Lot of Children and Residential Parents, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 245, 253 
(Spring/Summer 2001).   
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Then there are all the other varieties of parents.  Despite what some believe is the 
decline of the extended family, grandparents often play a prominent role in the lives of 
single parents.124 In many communities of color, relatives and close friends play a critical 
role in caring for children.125  Numerous commentators call for members of these 
“caretaking networks” to be treated as family.126  The ALI Principles suggest that 
custodial time be awarded to “de facto parents,” adults who have spent a significant 
amount of unpaid time taking care of a child.   
 Should these alternative caretakers be assigned legal obligations as well legal 
rights?  Far fewer commentators address this.127 As I have argued elsewhere, the law 
could logically impose obligation on anyone who enjoyed custodial rights,128  but it does 
not.  In a thoughtful review of some of the literature, Professor Susan Appleton has 
commented that obligation can be dispersed just as custodial time is because both time 
and money are easily divisible.129    Appleton does not address the theoretical vacuum at 
the core of any divisible award, though.   If the obligation is going to be split between 3 
(or 4, or more) “parents,” why and how should it be based on an econometric formula 
based entirely on a two-parent household?   
                                                 
124 ANDREW J. CHERLIN & FRANK F FURSTENBURG JR., THE NEW AMERICAN GRANDPARENT 163-64 (1986).  
125 Natalia Sarkisian & Naomi Gerstel, Kin Support Among Blacks and Whites: Race and Family 
Organization, 69 AM SOC REV 812 (2004).  
126 Melissa Murray uses the term caretaking networks, see, Murray, supra  note 28.  Other scholars clearly 
support the idea.  Kessler, supra, note 32; Dorothy Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U CHI L Rev 209 (1995).  
127 Both Susan Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L REV 11, 34-37 (2008) and Melanie 
Jacobs, More Parents, More Money, Reflections on the Financial Implications of Multiple Parenthood, 16 
CARDOZO J L & GENDER 217 (2010), have at least tried to address this question, but many other scholars 
seem to leave it for another day.  
128 Katharine K. Baker. Asymmetric Parenthood in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 89 at  
121, 129 (arguing that anyone who receives custodial time with the child by virtue of their relationship with 
the child could easily be held liable for some support of the child by virtue of their relationship with the 
child.  The ALI envisions allotting some people custodial time without making them liable for any child 
support.)   
129 Appleton, supra note 127.  
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The very few courts that have awarded parental status to more than two adults 
have ignored this problem.130  A Louisiana trial court that held two men (and one woman) 
responsible as parents added the income of all three parents together and then plugged 
that sum into the existing guidelines to determine an appropriate amount of support.131  It 
then divided responsibility for that amount of support between the genetic father and the 
husband of the mother, who had acted as a parent to the child.  The appellate court 
approved of this methodology because it was “in keeping with the spirit of the 
guidelines,”132 but using the guidelines in this context resulted in a number that was 
completely arbitrary – rooted in no theory whatsoever.  There is no equivalence scale for 
a three parent household.  The three parents were never a family that dissolved.  The 
child never experienced a household in which all the resources were shared and it is 
highly unlikely that sharing resources as a 3 adult household was ever an ideal for the 
parties. 
 The key principle of the formula-drafters, that the non-custodial parent should 
pay no more than he would pay if the household were in tact, loses all coherence if there 
are three parents.133  The numbers the court used were derived from data involving a 2 
adult households.  Three adult households could be very different – but we are not likely 
to know because tabulating equivalence scales for 3 adult households would require 
                                                 
130 See Jacob v. Schultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (2007) (finding three adults responsible for child support, the 
biological mother, her ex-partner who had adopted the children and the male sperm donor who had played 
an active role in the children’s life and been awarded custodial time and remanding for the trial court to 
determine the amounts of child support.  The sperm donor died while the case was pending so no court had 
to determine actual obligations. See PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Court Orders Sperm Donor to Pay 
Support; Death of Father Complicates Case, May 11, 2008, Sooner Edition); Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847 
(La. 1989) (finding both a marital father and a biological father responsible for child support, but not 
providing details of what each should pay or why).  
131 Wilson v. Wilson, 855 So2d 913 (La. App. 2 Cir 9/24/03).  
132 Id. at  916. 
133 That is, unless the three parents agreed amongst themselves to be joint parents and all share in the 
obligation. But even then, the formulas would have an equivalence scale problem.   
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finding enough 3 adult households both with and without children to make the scales 
meaningful.  If the law is to embrace the idea of three or more parents it needs to either 
(i) develop new formulae calculating the marginal expenditure amounts for multiple 
adults living in the same households as parents of the same children – though that is a 
model that is particularly likely to be counterfactual and deeply contested as an ideal or 
(ii) accept the legitimacy of a system that uses arbitrary percentages to establish child 
support obligation.      
3. Intended Families?  
Also curiously absent from the child support formulae is any consideration of an 
adult’s degree of commitment to parenthood.  All child support statutes piggyback onto 
parentage acts to determine parental status.  The support obligation is based on that status 
and nothing else. Thus, a man who never intended to be or acted as a father, but is found 
responsible in a paternity action based on his genetic connection to the child is 
responsible for the exact same amount as the man who committed to both the decision to 
conceive and the child once born.134    
Marriage is also usually irrelevant to parental obligation, though one could easily 
argue that that a pre-existing commitment to the ideal family unit on which the child 
                                                 
134 Parentage Acts are not as clear-cut as they first appear.  They almost always give a mother the right to 
establish paternity in a man who is genetically related to the child, as long as the child was not born through 
some form of artificial insemination. See  Baker, supra note 29 at 10-12  (explaining how parental status 
based on genetic connection can be waived in case of artificial reproduction).   At the same time, parentage 
acts establish presumptions of paternity based on marriage and living patterns.  (The husband of a mother is 
presumed to be the father as is a man who holds himself out as a father of a child.)  It is not uncommon for 
these presumptions to clash with each other or with biological evidence.   When there is just one potential 
father involved, genetic evidence usually establishes paternal status. When there are more than two 
potential fathers involved, things get much more complicated.  Some judges use best interest of the child 
tests to determine whether the genetic evidence should trump.  Other judges use best interest of the child 
determinations to exclude genetic evidence.  See id. 12-14 (discussing law and cases).   For a more general 
discussion of the inconsistencies in paternity doctrine, see id at  1 – 38.   The incoherence of paternal status 
determinations, particularly for fathers, just makes the child support guideline’s reliance on those 
determinations more problematic.     
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support guidelines are based should be relevant if one is to be found accountable under 
those guidelines.   If the law took the marital commitment seriously, it might make 
distinctions between the person who was willing to make a commitment to a family and 
the person who was not.  The de-stigmatization and constitutional protection of non-
marital sex makes it clear that a man who engages in consensual non-marital sex has 
done nothing wrong.   The decision to have the child is not his at all.135 Why is it 
inappropriate to hold a man who never committed to anyone or desired any child to a 
lesser obligation than a man who did so commit?  Contraception does fail.  Men are lied 
to.  If the law should pay more attention to context, as the vast majority of the scholarship 
in favor of more expansive parenthood argues, shouldn’t the law also make distinctions 
between those men who want children and those that do not?   
In 1972 the Supreme Court rejected the idea that treating illegitimate children less 
favorably than legitimate children discouraged non-marital sex.136  Constitutional 
doctrine now forbids state from sanctioning most non-marital sex,137 but a marital/non-
marital distinction for child support need not be rooted in punishing extra-marital sex or 
illegitimate children. It can be rooted in the notion that marriage is a proxy for 
commitment to a child who is born to the family created by marriage.  After all, married 
men commit 50% of their earned wealth to their spouses. Why do they commit less to 
their children? 
                                                 
135 The man has no say in whether the pregnancy is terminated. See Baker, supra note 29 at 18 (2004) 
(arguing that the constitutionally protected reproductive decision-making accorded to the mother makes her 
the proximate cause of the child’s existence).  
136 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 US 762, 769 (1977).   A crucial advantage, from the state’s perspective, of 
holding non-marital fathers liable for child support is that it helps keep dependencies private, see Katharine 
K. Baker, Bionomativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 671-673 (2008),  but a 
policy decision in favor of holding non-marital fathers responsible for child support is not the same as a 
policy decision in favor of holding non-marital fathers responsible for the same amount as marital fathers.   
137 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding a right to engage in homosexual sodomy). 
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4. Alternative ?   
The modern reality of parenting seems to bear strikingly little resemblance to the 
ideal on which the child support obligation formulae are based.  Many parents never live 
in the household on which the model is based.  Some parents do not want to.  Others 
experience the two parent “norm” only temporarily and most who never live it or leave it 
eventually live in a different kind of family structure.  Those who embrace the ideal and 
the commitments it is thought to embody are treated just as everyone else if for obligation 
purposes.  And even if we accept the legitimacy of rooting obligation in a (very) 
hypothetical ideal, we must grapple with the child support formulae’s use of inaccurate 
data, unverifiable conclusions and contested notions of entitlement.      
One can fairly easily imagine an effective, if completely arbitrary, alternative 
regime.  Every non-custodial parent could be required to pay 15% of his income toward 
his children (with perhaps decreasing percentages per child).  Parents who clearly 
intended to parent might pay more, say 25%.  If there were some parents who had 
substantially fewer parental rights, they could be ascribed a different, lesser percentage, 
say 10%.   These percentages are not derived from anything.  I made them up.  But if put 
into practice, they would likely not seem any more or less consistent with what parental 
obligation should be than the current numbers.  In fact, they might be perceived as more 
fair because they incorporated more context.  This alternative system could work almost 
as efficiently as the current one138 and would not be subject to the same methodological 
critique because there would be no methodology from which the numbers were derived.   
                                                 
138 It would not be quite as efficient because courts would have to determine who had “substantially fewer” 
parental rights, but that analysis would probably be done as part of the parentage and parental rights 
adjudications that are currently being conducted without any consideration of whether the allocation of 
rights should affect the allocation of responsibilities. See  Katharine K. Baker,  Marriage and Parenthood 
as Rights and Status 71 OHIO ST. L. J. 127, 180-81 (2010)  
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The state would simply impose them.   Parenthood would entail a 15% obligation 
because that is what the law said parenthood was, but that is hardly different than what 
the law does now.  
 
B. Property Division 
Domestic Relations cases constitute slightly less than one quarter of all civil law 
cases filed in state courts.139   Of those domestic relations cases, almost 30% involve 
divorce.140  Of those divorce cases, virtually all require some distribution of assets and 
debts.141 The vast majority of that distribution is negotiated between the parties without 
judicial evaluation.  Ninety percent of divorce cases settle,142 and unlike most civil 
litigants, divorcing parties usually negotiate a settlement without an interlocutory judicial 
decision giving them some indication of how the trial might go.143  The established 
background legal rules are thus critically important in setting the parameters within in 
which the parties bargain over the billions of dollars in property that are divided.144  
As Part II suggested, although not as rigid as the child support formulas, most 
states have now settled on a clear, rule-based property distribution system. It is far 
simpler than the child support formulas:  each party receives half of all marital property 
                                                 
139 Natl. Center for State Courts, Examining the Work of State Courts, An Analysis of 2007 State Court 
Caseloads (2009) 13 (excluding criminal, traffic and juvenile cases, domestic relations cases constitute 
23.9% of the remaining state cases).  
140 Id. 
141 Not all parties have assets to be divided, but most couples that do not have assets, have marital debts to 
be distributed.  
142 D. ABRAMS, N. CAHN, C. ROSS AND D. MEYER, CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW  921 (“Mirroring the 
overwhelming percentage of civil disputants who settle out of court, more than 90% of divorcing spouses 
and other domestic relations disputant resolve financial and child-related matters alike by negotiation 
before requesting the court to enter the final decree in accordance with their agreement.)    
143 Id.   
144 See Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, 88 YALE L J 950, 
950-951 (1979). (“We see the primary function of contemporary divorce law not as imposing order from 
above, but rather as providing a framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine their 
post-dissolution rights and responsibilities.”)     
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or at least judges start from that presumption.  Marital property includes all property 
produced by either spouse’s labors during the marriage.  The ALI Principles strongly 
endorse an equal division of marital property.145 
There is something intuitively appealing about a 50/50 background rule. It 
suggests a paradigm of marriage as an equal partnership with equal participation from the 
parties.  It relies on what Professor Susan Prager referred to as “sharing principles,” the 
idea that married parties presume, or should be encouraged to presume, that they share 
what they have with their spouse.146    As for how much should be shared, the comments 
to the ALI Guidelines suggest, “in the absence of reasons to the contrary, one adheres to 
the default meaning of fair, which is equal.”147  The history, theory and contemporary 
context of property distribution suggest that there are plenty of reasons to question the 
notion that fair means equal though.    
1. Rooted in History? 
The genesis of the 50/50 presumption in the common law states is usually traced 
to the original 8 community property states.148   A leading Family Law text writes 
“[e]quitable distribution of property in the United States is an outgrowth of the systems of 
community property introduced into the Western Hemisphere by Spanish and French 
settlers.”149  That text goes on to quote a major treatise on community property:  
Equality is the cardinal precept of the community property system. At the 
foundation of this system is the principle that all wealth acquired by the joint 
efforts of the husband and wife shall be common property . . . . [T]he marriage is 
                                                 
145 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 67, § 4.04, Comment c., p. 665.  
146 Susan Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L Rev 1 (1977).  
147 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 67, §4.10, Comment b, p. 752.  In defending the same provision, Ira 
Ellman writes, “any group of schoolchildren dividing a bag of candy [knows] the default meaning of fair is 
“equal.”  See Ellman, Inventing Family Law, supra note 110 at  884. 
148 See supra note 70 for a list of the states.  
149 JOHN DE WITTT GREGORY, PETER SWISHER AND SHERYL WOLF, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW at 388 
(2005).  
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a community of which each spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or 
her industry to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the 
property after its dissolution.150   
 
That language goes down quite smoothly now, probably even more smoothly than 
when it was written, in 1971, but it only faintly reflects the history of community 
property.  Community property regimes did not traditionally construct marriage as a 
community of equals.  Women were nominal owners of half of the property in 
community property states, but during the marriage, community property states gave the 
husband the sole power to manage (or mismanage) marital assets.151  It was not until 
changing social norms and constitutional gender equality cases began to force legislative 
change in the mid-1970s that women were given the authority to exercise control over 
community property while the marriage was intact.152   
Just as important, as Charles Donahue chronicled, community property regimes 
were not founded on notions of equality in or after marriage.  They were largely an 
outgrowth of feudal systems in continental Europe that were concerned with maintaining 
family wealth by restricting individuals’ ability to alienate family lands.153  The parallel 
development of different systems in England and on the Continent can be explained by 
the relative strength of monarchical power and a more conscious desire to simplify 
ownership so as to facilitate development in England, versus the decentralization of 
power in large feudal families and a strong desire to keep power in those families by 
                                                 
150 W DEFUNIAK & M VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, at 2-3 (1971).  
151 HARRIS, TEITELBAUM, CARBONE, , supra note 56 at 50-51.  The Supreme Court struck down the 
community property practice of vesting authority to manage marital funds in the husband in Kirchberg v. 
Feenstra, 450 US 455 (1981).  
152 Id. at 51.   
153 Donahue, supra note 73.   
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restricting alienation in France.154  If a woman in Continental Europe divorced or if her 
husband died (far more likely), her family retained half of the marital estate. In England, 
a much larger share of the estate went to the husband’s heirs.155  As Donahue wrote, “[i]t 
is hard to escape the general conclusion that what looks at first blush like a system more 
favorable to the woman was in fact a system more favorable to the woman’s family.”156  
It has only been in the last 40 years that community property rules have come to be 
viewed as partnership rules, reflecting the idea that spouses are marital equals, fully 
entitled to equal shares of marital property.   
2. Partnership? 
It is too simplistic, though, to state that either community property regimes or the 
current equitable distribution rules reflect background partnership principles.  
Partnerships can only be treated as such legally if they involve “two or more persons 
[carrying] on as co-owners a business for profit.”157  What business are two persons 
carrying on in a marriage?  It is not, as it possibly once was, to have children.  Empirical 
work confirms that most people think the reason to marry is for  “mutual happiness and 
fulfillment,” much more than for “bearing or raising children” and certainly more than to 
make money.158      
                                                 
154 Id. at 78-84  (Donahue goes on to argue that the fullest explanation of the parallel development of 
different systems also requires taking account of the French notion of family community, which had always 
involved more sharing of wealth among family members than was common in England.  Id. at 85-87.) 
155 A widow still would have been entitled to her dower, roughly 30% of his property, at his death.  
156 Donahue, supra note 73 at 80. 
157 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §6. 
158 “[B]y a margin of three-to-one, Americans say that the main purpose of marriage is the ‘mutual 
happiness and fulfillment’ of adults rather than the ‘bearing and raising of children.’”  See Marriage and 
Parenthood, supra note 5 at 2.  
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Viewing marriage as an economic partnership also assumes a degree of financial 
enmeshment that seems at odds with many modern descriptions of marriage.  Consider 
this definition of marriage, suggested by a leading legal scholar thirty-five years ago:  
Contemporary marriage cannot be legally defined any more precisely than as 
some sort of relationship between two individuals of definite duration, 
involving some kind of sexual conduct  . . . that may be formed by the consent 
of both parties and dissolved at the will of either.159 
 
The law of business partnership assumes that the joint venture has a purpose and that 
purpose is economic. Modern marriage seems to have no purpose except personal 
fulfillment, and it is not clear why that need involve any economic commitment.  In one 
of the leading cases embodying the changing sexual, social and constitutional norms of 
the 1970s, the Supreme Court held that “the marital couple is not an independent entity . . 
. but an association of two individuals, each with a separate intellectual and emotional 
make-up.”160  Why did  the law contemporaneously impose a rule that treats marital 
partners as one economic entity?  
 The vast majority of business partnerships involving any venture with profits to 
be divided also have partnership agreements that explicitly define how profits are to be 
distributed.  It is disingenuous to suggest that because the default rule for partnerships is 
equal division, equal division rules for marital property rely on partnership norms.  The 
default rule for partnerships is routinely contracted around, while the default rule for 
marriages almost never is.161 
                                                 
159 Homer Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L. J. 441, 444 (1976).  
160 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US 438, 453 (1972).  
161 Prenuptial agreements are more common than they once were, but the vast majority of marriages do not 
include them.  Gary Belsky, Living by the Rules, MONEY, May 1996 at 100, 102 (suggesting that only 5% 
of marrying couples sign prenups). Moreover, as suggested infra text accompanying notes 172-175, the fact 
that prenuptial agreements routinely contract around the 50/50 rule suggests that “fair” does not necessarily 
mean “equal.”     
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 3. Sharing Principles? 
Nor can “sharing principles” adequately explain the current property distribution 
rules. For sure, Professor Prager is correct that though they are not required to, many 
spouses approach their marriage as a sharing enterprise.  Couples share, among other 
things, decision-making, income, time, and property.  But not all couples share the same 
amounts of these things.  More important, the extent to which they are willing to share 
while married can vary significantly from the amount that they think they should have to 
share at dissolution.  While married, while in sharing mode, a spouse is most likely 
sharing her inherited property with her spouse.  At divorce, she probably does not want to 
share that inherited property anymore and the law does not make her.  None of the 
community property states in this country consider inherited property to be marital 
property and the vast majority of common law states exclude it also.  Those “hotchpotch” 
states162 that do consider all property, from wherever derived, subject to dissolution at 
divorce, routinely stray from the 50/50 rule in order to award inherited property to the 
party that inherited it.163  
Thus, it is not the idea of sharing that explains what should count as marital 
property.  The current rule, that what must be split is all property produced by marital 
labor has been justified because “marriage involves the commitment of both spouse’s 
labors.”164  But that is a simply a normative declaration of what marriage should be.  It is 
potentially both under and over-inclusive. It does not include all property earned during 
the marriage, because many states treat appreciation of non-marital property as non-
                                                 
162 See, supra, note 78.  
163 OLDHAM, supra note 72,  §3.03[3].  
164 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 67,§4.04, Comment c, p. 665. 
 HOMOGENEOUS RULES 
 
 
 43
marital property.165   It does not include all assets acquired during the marriage because, 
particularly if people are married in their 20s and 30s, the largest asset acquired is likely 
to be human capital, which courts, for the most part, have resisted dividing as marital 
property.166   
It also may include more property than many people think appropriate.  What 
happened to the “intuitive” idea, so prevalent in child support, that each individual has 
the first claim to his own income?167   Why, if a payor is not expected to share anywhere 
near half his income with his child or children while they are minors,168 should he be 
expected to pay half his income to his wife while the marriage is active?    
d. Contribution ? 
One answer to this is that spouses, unlike children, have earned their 50% share.  
Theorists concerned about women’s welfare tried for years to argue that women’s non-
monetary contributions to a marriage entitled them to an equal share of the joint marital 
labor.  But the market value of women’s unpaid domestic labor often comes nowhere 
near half of the man’s economic contribution.  More problematic still is the 
incommensurability of much of women’s marital investment.169  Women tend to invest 
                                                 
165 David Hofstein, Scott Finger, Ellen Weiner, Update to Equitable Distribution in Large Marital Estate 
Cases, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 439, 447 (2008).  
166 Carbone, supra note 88 at  62.  
167 This is the Earner’s Priority Principle, referred to above. See supra note 115.    
168 A parent with many children may have to pay close to 50% of his income, but, for instance under a 
typical POI statute, a payor does not reach 50% until  he has 6 children, and then the amount is capped at 
50%.  See 750 ILCS 5/505 .   
169 See supra notes 99-100 and text accompanying (market value of women’s domestic services is often 
quite low and many households contributions simply have no market value).  
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more in relationship-specific labor than men do.170  Relationship-specific work rarely has 
any market value or even value that might transfer to a future relationship.171  
Recognizing that women tend to disproportionately contribute this non-
commodifiable labor is undoubtedly important in devising any marital property 
distribution scheme, but recognizing the commensurability problem does not tell us how  
women’s labor should be valued.  How does the law get from incommensurability to 
50/50?  Apparently by fiat.  The ALI simply asserts: “the incommensurability of the 
spouse’s nonfinancial contributions frustrates any effort to attach monetary value to them.  
Faced with this measurement difficulty, it may be sensible for the law to presume 
irrebutably that the spouse’s contributed equally to their entire relationship.”  It may be 
sensible. But it is also just a definition of marriage, masquerading as a property 
distribution theory.172    
When negotiated by the parties themselves, in prenuptial agreements, 
distributions that stray from the 50/50 rule are not considered unfair because they stray 
from the 50/50 rule.  People enter into prenuptial agreements because they want to avoid 
                                                 
170 PAULA ENGLAND AND GEORGE FARKAS, HOUSEHOLD, EMPLOYMENT AND GENDER, at 44-45, 55-56 
(1986).   
171 Id.  
172 In the Reporter’s Notes, though not in the comments, the ALI drafters concede that the equal division 
rule relies on an “ideological norm.”  ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 67 at 748.   
The ALI also proposes treating non-marital couples who have lived together for three years the 
same as marital couples for property distribution purposes. See id,  § 6.01 et seq.. This treatment suggests 
that the ALI would define not only marriage but all cohabitating relationship by the ideological norm of 
equal sharing.  To my knowledge, no court has adopted this norm in the non-marital context and the ALI 
proposal has been soundly criticized for both undermining marriage, see Lynn Wardle, Maknig Marriage 
Matter Less:  The ALI Domestic Partnership Principles are One Step in the Right Direction, 2001 BYU L 
REV 1189 (underscoring the importance of treating marriage as a distinct status) and not providing 
cohabiting couples sufficient freedom to not be married, see Elizabeth Scott, Domestic Partnerships, 
Implied Contracts and Law Reform, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 89, 331, 332 (describing the 
ALI proposal for non-marital couples as “coercive and paternalistic”);  Marsha Garrison, Marriage 
Matters:  What’s Wrong with the ALI’s Domestic Partnerhship Proposal, id, 305, 306 (arguing that 
adoption of the ALI rule would “diminish personal autonomy.”) 
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the background property distribution and alimony rules.173   Courts in states that require a 
substantive assessment of whether prenuptial agreements are fair, routinely find that they 
are, even though they provide for far less than 50% of the property produced by marital 
labor.174  The growing legal acceptance of prenuptial agreements belies the idea that 
“fair” necessarily means “equal.”175 
5. Alternatives?  
In short, the 50/50 partnership view of marriage is not well grounded in history.  
The definition of what counts as marital property is arbitrary.  The idea of equal sharing 
is inconsistent with other principles of family law obligation, like the earner’s priority 
principle, and with accepted notions of entitlement upon dissolution, like the contribution 
principle.176    The defense of the 50/50 partnership view of marriage is a normative one. 
This is what the law wants marriage to be.   
                                                 
173 For the most part, parties are not free to negotiate potential child support in a prenuptial agreement 
because the state, pursuant to its Parens Patraie authority, retains the power to determine appropriate child 
support amounts.  
174 Developments in the Law:  Marriage as Contract and Marriage as Partnership: The Future of 
Antenuptial Agreement Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2075, 2081 (May, 2003).  
175 See supra note 147  (for the idea that “fair” means “equal”).  See also, Judith Younger, Lovers’ 
Contracts in the Courts:  Forsaking the Minimum Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 349 (2007)  
(passim) (describing growing tendency of courts to uphold prenuptial agreements in which a spouse got 
substantially less than one half the property).    There is some tension between the very strong ideological 
underpinnings of the 50/50 rule and the growing acceptance of  prenuptial agreements.  If the 50/50 divide 
rule cannot necessarily be justified as anything other than an assertion of what marriage is, the argument for 
enforcing prenuptial agreements that contract out of that 50/50 divide diminish in strength.  If marriage 
“involves the commitment of both spouse’s labors,” see supra note   , and if a 50/50 divide of the proceeds 
of that labor is what the law wants marriage to be, why let married people contract around it?  Why not tell 
them they cannot get married instead?   The Committee considering modifications to the Uniform  
Premarital Agreement Act apparently recognizes these tensions. Thomas Oldham, With All My worldly 
Good I thee Endow or Maybe Not:  A Reevaluation of the Uniform Permarital Agreement Act After Three 
Decades (University of Houston Public Law and Legal Theory Series 2011-A-1) (discussing proposals to 
impose more restrictions on prenuptial agreements).  
176 In the case of a business insolvency, for instance, creditors divide the proceeds of property in proportion 
to their respective contributions.  See Black’s Law Dictionary, “Contribution.”   
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For what it is worth, I agree with the law.  I think the 50/50 rule is a good one 
because it reflects a marital ideal – unity – that I endorse.177  The history of marital unity 
is problematic though.  Unity has been used to justify, among other things, married 
women’s inability to own property and their powerlessness in the face of domestic 
violence. 178  Many courts and feminists criticize the idea of unity,179  though scholars 
who are protective of notions of family autonomy, are probably more comfortable with 
it.180  My point is simply that marital unity as an ideal is controversial. Why has unity 
been adopted so easily in the economic context?  It does not reflect what are considered 
to be contemporary views about the roles of individuals within marriage.181 
Just as we did for child support, we can imagine a different percentage for 
property distribution and it could be justified as easily on normative grounds.  For 
instance, why not pay more attention to contemporary norms and say that when marital 
earnings are disproportionate - perhaps when one spouse makes more than three times 
what the other spouse makes – then the lesser earning spouse should get no more than 
one third of the marital earnings.  The average – remember the child support guidelines 
                                                 
177   Carolyn Frantz and Hanoch Dagan have suggested that the 50/50 distribution represents an ideal of 
marriage as an “egalitarian legal community.”  Carolyn Frantz and Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 
104 COLUM L REV 75, 77 (2004).  Whatever ideal one thinks the 50/50 rule represents, the property  
distribution scheme institutes a particular normative view of marriage.  
178 The notion of marital unity often traced to Blackstone, who wrote, “by marriage, the husband and wife 
are one person in law . . . the legal existence of the woman . . . is incorporated or consolidated into that of 
the husband.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 42 at 442.   
179 See CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 193-194 (1989); Elizabeth 
Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN.L. REV 973 (1991). Others have noted, thought that the 
notion of the family as a unit “ is seemingly central to the emphasis on “family privacy” and “family 
autonomy” that characterizes much discussion of the relationship between state and family.” HARRIS, 
TEITELBAUM, CARBONE, supra note 57at 33 
180  For scholars supportive of some idea of unity, see MILTON REGAN, JR. ALONE TOGETHER, LAW AND 
THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE (1999)  (passim);  Anne Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 
67 TUL L REV 955, 1020-21 (1993) (“while the closed doors of the home have shielded abuse, isolation and 
exploitation, they have at the same time nurtured love and commitment”); Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as 
an Entity, 22 UC DAVIS L REV 865, 912  (1989) (passim). 
181 See Eisenstadt, supra note 160  (“the marital couple is not an independent entity”).  
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use averages - wife in this country contributes less than a third to married household 
finances.182  That which she receives in excess of her direct contribution could 
compensate her for her family-specific investment. A one-third distribution rule would 
even be rooted in history. It was the dower share that wives in common law jurisdictions 
used to receive as widows and what some early common law jurisdictions used as a 
presumption for alimony when divorcing wives had no property titled in their name.183  
Today it would need to go to men or women, but could always go to the lesser earning 
spouse.184  
Or, we might adopt a completely different blanket property distribution rule. We 
could do away with the concept of marital property.  In a world of gender equality, it is 
not so clear what is wrong with the old title based system. Each spouse in a marriage 
should be careful to title a certain amount of property in his or her own name, or at least 
jointly.  Anything that is held jointly could be distributed evenly.  This system would 
have the added advantage of eliminating entirely the marital property determination stage 
and it would help put married people and cohabitants on equal footing, which many 
people might see as a positive, appropriate move for the law to make. 
Some people probably believe that, in practice, the law currently reflects a title-
based system because so many marital obligations are resolved through private 
agreement.  Indeed, antenuptial and postnuptial agreements are enforced in most states. 
The vast majority of litigants negotiate settlements at divorce without contesting anything 
                                                 
182 See New Economics, supra note 15 at 16.  College-educated wives contribute the most to household 
income (35%). Wives with some college contribute 31% to household income.  High school graduate wives 
contribute 27% and wives with less than a high school education contribute 20% to household income.   
183 See supra note 88.  
184 This system would be particularly unfortunate for a  primary wage earner  who is also a primary 
caretaker, but anyone in that situation is not served well by the current rules either.  
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in court. Many states also adjudicate cohabitation contracts involving shared property.  In 
all of these cases, though, the background family law rules matter tremendously.   
The 50/50 rule creates a status quo bias for all property distribution agreements.185  
It also sets the unconscionability threshold pursuant to which ante and postnpuptial 
agreements are evaluated.186   Fair does not necessarily mean equal, but the law starts 
from that presumption.   
The background marital property distribution rules are just as important for cases 
involving non-marital agreements.  Plaintiffs in these cases assert contract claims that 
only make sense in a legal culture that incorporates our extant family law norms and 
rules.  If the idea of marital property were not firmly entrenched, why would a court 
every imply  a contract involving a promise of “one-half equity interest in all real estate 
acquired” in exchange for services as a “chauffeur, bodyguard, social and business 
secretary, partner and counselor.”187   If there were not background norms validating the 
                                                 
185 See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV 608 
(exploring how default rules establish a status quo, which, like most status quos, make alternatives seem 
more cumbersome).   See also Carolyn Frantz , Should the Rules of Marital Property Be Normative, 2004 U 
CHI L. F 265, 270 (“Even given the availability of private order, the legal rules surrounding issues of 
marital property tend to stick. That is, whether or not spouses would actually choose these rules in a 
situation of perfect choice, they end up with them.”) .  
186 See ELLMAN, KURTZ, supra note 56 at 737-38.   There is evidence that some courts are becoming 
increasingly skeptical of the notion of unconscionability and increasingly willing to enforce an agreement 
whatever its terms.  See Younger, supra note 175 (passim) (describing cases in which dependent spouses 
received considerably less than 50% of marital assets).  Mostly, though, what the cases regarding 
unconscionability show is that there is significant disagreement about what that term might mean. That is, 
judges routinely disagree about whether a particular antenuptial agreement is fair enough.  Professor 
Younger’s article documents various state supreme courts disagreeing with themselves, id. at 364-378 and 
even more cases in which trial, appellate and highest courts all disagree with each other, id (passim).  One 
point emerges clearly: there is wild divergence on what different judges are willing to label unfair.  That 
divergence and  the extensive litigation costs it engenders mean that the costs of enforcing antenuptial 
agreements may well not be worth the benefits of drafting them.  As long as that continues to be the case, 
private contracting is not likely to supplant state-imposed rules of obligation. See also Oldham, supra note 
175 (discussing proposals to make antenuptial agreements harder to enforce and more “fair.”)  
187 Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 202 Cal App 3d 447 (1988) (the plaintiff in this case alleged 
both an express, oral contract and an implied contract, but the court was willing to entertain  both claims 
and the existence of the express, oral contract is highly suspect);  See also, Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P2d 106 
(1976) (alleged contract to “share equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts 
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idea of alimony, why would a dependent person’s reliance on a paramour’s promise to 
“support her for life” be remotely reasonable?188   
Plaintiffs in these non-marital cases do not rely on unjust enrichment or quantum 
meruit claims.  Their awards would be comparatively tiny if they did – for the same 
reason that contribution does not work well as a theoretical basis for property sharing or 
alimony.  The market value of services is thought not to capture the true value of 
romantic companionship, but what makes a court think that “half the value of all property 
accumulated” appropriately captures that value?  The reason these implicit contracts are 
not readily dismissed as absurd is because the prevailing law sets the prevailing 
understanding of what people might expect to give and get in a relationship.  If we 
eliminated state-imposed property sharing at divorce, would any court really believe a 
plaintiff who pled the existence of an oral or implied contract to share half of the 
income?189  Why would anyone make that contract if it wasn’t the prevailing legal 
norm?190     
Here, it is worth noting that although the last 40 years show striking changes in 
the ways families are created, function and re-organize, those changes reflect average 
                                                                                                                                                 
whether individual or combined . . . [while] plaintiff would  . . . render her services as a companion 
homemaker, housekeeper and cook . . . .”  
188 In re Roccomante, 808 A.2d 838 (NJ 2002) (awarding ex-lover support for life after her paramour died).  
189 There is a strong tension between the decreasing rigor with which some antenuptial agreements are 
reviewed, see Younger, supra note 175, and the increasing tendency of courts to be willing to find oral or 
implicit contracts in cases involving non-married cohabitants.  If more and more people enter into contracts 
that involve much less than 50/50 sharing and if more and more courts uphold contracts in which the 
dependent spouse is left with little, then few courts are going to be willing to imply a contract for 
significant sharing between non-married cohabitants.   
190 As suggested above, perhaps we should do away with state-imposed sharing norms and the 
interdependence, reliance and expectation that it enables.  In such a world, dissolution agreements 
involving shared assets would need to be explicit and in writing, so at to minimize the (inevitably norm-
infused) interpretive role of the courts.   But the world in which we live now is clearly one in which 
interdependencies do develop. There is reliance and there is expectation.  It is not at all clear that people 
would prefer to live in a society in which the only spousal obligations that arose, arose by virtue of 
explicitly negotiated agreement.  The fact that only a small portion of marriages entered into involve 
prenuptial agreements suggests a strong aversion to such a norm. 
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numbers.  There are consistent and profound class differences.  For the college-educated 
middle and upper middle-class, the traditional nuclear family does not seem nearly as 
anachronistic.  Among the college educated who marry and have children, the divorce 
rate has receded to the level it was at before the technological and social changes that 
were supposed to have changed everything.191  Higher socio-economic status is correlated 
with older age at first marriage, greater likelihood that cohabitation will lead to marriage, 
lower rate of cohabitation disruption, lower rate of first marriage disruption, higher 
probability of remarriage and lower probability of remarriage disruption.192   
Education has become the great divider.  Education is now a better predictor of 
who one will marry than is religion.193  This may be in part because college graduates can 
most easily reap the benefits of marriage as an income-pooling device,194 though wives in 
college educated couples contribute less to household income than wives in any other 
demographic group.195    College-educated couples are also the most likely to have 
significant property to distribute and the most likely to have a particularly gendered 
division of labor.196   In other words, the women most helped by the 50/50 divide are the 
                                                 
191  CAHN AND CARBONE, supra note 18 at 39.  (“The college-educated, who postpone childrearing until the 
parents achieve a measure of financial self-sufficiency and emotional maturity, have become more likely to 
marry and less likely to divorce than the rest of the population, with two-parent families that remain intact, 
replicating the statistics that existed before no-fault divorce, the pill, and legalized abortion.” ) 
192 CDC, Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce and ReMarriage in the U.S, supra note 11 at 30-31. 
193 CHERLIN, supra note 7 at 178-79. 
194 Id. For people on various forms of state support (TANF payments, food stamps etc.), the gains from 
marriage can be significantly less because income-testing and eligibility rules produce a taxation rate for 
marginal money earned that is much higher for the least wealthy than the most wealthy. Sara McLanahan, 
Diverging Destinies 614, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 616  (2004). (Any economic advantage gained by adding 
an additional household member’s income can be readily offset by decreasing eligibility for government 
benefits). 
195 Wives married to college-educated men contribute, on average 26% of household income. Wives 
married to husbands with less than a high school education contribute 29%.  Wives of high school 
graduates or husbands with some college contribute 33% to household income.  New Economics, supra 
note 15 at 16.  
196 See Baker, supra note 99 at  607  (college and professionally educated women, who are likely to be the 
most wealthy,  are disproportionately likely to work significantly less than their husbands.)   
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ones people might have thought would need it least, those with college educations or 
better, who once had or still have solid jobs and who, when compared to their class 
counterparts of forty years ago, are much better able to take care of themselves.  Marriage 
really matters to these women.     
 
C. Alimony 
Alimony is by far the least formulaic of all of the family law obligations.  It is 
also the most theorized.  These points may be related.  Widely followed rules, regardless 
of their theoretical justification, breed their own legitimacy.  Normativity follows 
functionality and consistent and efficient rules become legitimate by virtue of their 
consistent and uniform application.  This is just beginning to happen with alimony 
though.  For most of the last 40 years, the legitimacy of alimony has been consistently 
questioned.197   
The first question one might ask is why.  As most scholars agree, no one has ever 
developed a sound theory for distinguishing alimony from property division.    Many 
state statutes provide comparable lists of factors to be considered for property division 
and alimony.198  The ALI states that the “policy issues involved in formulating criteria 
governing entitlement to alimony are largely indistinguishable from those that govern 
entitlement to an enhanced share of marital property.”199    In 2002, June Carbone wrote 
“we are no closer to determining what purpose the distinction between property division 
                                                 
197 See supra notes 92-100  for list of articles explaining the theories of alimony. 
198 Compare 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (distribution of marital property) with 750 ILCS 5/504 (maintenance).   
Many other states, including New York, Pennsylvania , Massachusetts, New Jersey, Alabama, and 
Nebraska, to name just some, have comparable lists of factors.   
199 ALI PRINCIPLEs, supra note 67, § 4.09, Comment d, p. 736. 
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and alimony should serve.”200   The 50/50 property distribution has been easily 
implemented and notwithstanding the above critique, accepted.  Alimony rules have not.  
1.  Backstop ? 
One role alimony has served, either on purpose or by default, is as a kind of 
backstop or “residual remedy, a grab-bag into which claims are put when they cannot be 
cast as child support or property allocation.”201   The attraction of such a backstop is not 
surprising given the problems described.  Because of the relative importance that the 
child support guidelines pay to the marginal expenditure principle (and its protection of 
the non-custodial parent), the child support guidelines leave children from households in 
which their two parents earn very different amounts living at a standard considerably 
below the marital standard of living.202  An alimony award can help raise that standard of 
living.  Because the property distribution rule usually fails to include the accumulation of 
human capital as an asset capable of being divided, spouses who invested in relationships 
with someone who was accumulating the human capital to enable him to be wealthy later 
in life are often entitled to only a small portion of that wealth.  Alimony awards can 
provide those spouses with more.  Providing a backstop because the mechanisms for 
determining other forms of family obligations are inadequate hardly seems like a 
legitimate source of obligation though.  
2. Compensation? 
While acknowledging that alimony awards serve this residual function, the ALI 
coins a new term for the awards that were originally known as alimony.  It calls them 
“compensatory payments” and claims that they are to remedy “unfair loss allocation” that 
                                                 
200 Carbone, supra note 88 at 54).  
201 Ellman, supra note 94 at  810.  
202  See supra 119 ; ALI PRINCIPLES,  supra note 67, §3.05, Comments p. 440.    
 HOMOGENEOUS RULES 
 
 
 53
may occur at a marriage’s dissolution.  To its credit, unlike most of the states and 
counties that are currently devising alimony guidelines, the ALI tries to articulate a 
theory for alimony.  But it is not clear that it succeeds.  Why does a spouse need to be 
compensated with alimony if she is getting property?  Her 50% share of property is hers 
by virtue of the marriage.  Why doesn’t the property cover her loss?  She has lost the 
marital standard of living, but why is she entitled to it?  As analyzed above, theories of 
expectation inevitably reduce to questions of fault203 and theories of reliance inevitably 
reduce to unanswerable questions.204 
3. Explanation  
The confusion surrounding these questions has clear costs. Without sufficient 
guidance on what an award might be, many women – even those in fairly long-term 
marriages – forego even attempting to secure alimony because bargaining for it is too 
difficult.205   Alimony also tends to consume more court time than other litigated family 
law obligations.206  The states and counties developing guidelines seem more concerned 
with these costs than with the theoretical basis for an alimony award.  
What is emerging as salient in the places implementing alimony guidelines are 
two variables, length of marriage and earning differential.   The proposed ALI 
“compensatory payments” consider these variables, as do almost all of the formulas 
                                                 
203 See supra text accompanying notes 88-90. (both spouses cannot live at the marital standard unless there 
is significant unused excess).  To suggest that one spouse is entitled to such a standard is to suggest that the 
other spouse is not and that ineluctably requires a rejection of the earner’s priority principle and /or an 
inquiry that is based on some concept of fault as the basis of entitlement. See Carbone, supra note 88 at 74-
75. 
204 See supra text accompanying notes  9293.  The rehabilitation standard, a core part of the no-fault reform 
era changes, used a reliance idea.  But to determine reliance, one needs some sense of what the alternatives 
might have been so that one can determine what a party might have lost by relying.  In a long term 
marriage, assessing what those alternatives might have been so many years before  is extraordinarily 
difficult.  
205 Elgin, Alimony Guidelines: Is It Time, 83 MD. B J 46. 
206 Ellman. supra note 94 at, 813.  
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currently used by individual judges and counties.   By incorporating these two variables, 
the formulas are likely to protect the ex-spouse most likely to garner the public’s 
sympathy, a traditional spouse from a long-term marriage, who dedicated herself to non-
remunerative activities and who has grown accustomed, over a long period of time, to the 
elevated living standard that her husband could provide.  The empirical evidence tells us 
that this spouse is much less likely than her younger counterpart to initiate a divorce and 
less likely to marry again quickly.207  Alimony, therefore, may seem particularly 
appropriate.  
Again, though, it is easy to imagine factual scenarios in which this divorcing 
spouse would not garner much sympathy.  What if she had given up on the relationship 
10 years before it actually dissolved and he kept trying to make the relationship work?  
What if she had as many affairs as he did?  What if her spending patterns account for the 
relative lack of marital property because she has already consumed so much marital 
wealth?  What if he wants to quit his job and just relax for a while, but she is does not 
want to lose her lifestyle, so she leaves – probably entitled to alimony.   Judges resist 
making distinctions based on these factors, apparently because they feel increasingly 
uncomfortable making the moral judgments necessary to distinguish between these 
claimants.  And it is not clear that the public at large would be comfortable with judges 
making those judgments.  With so much diversity of opinion on what constitutes 
appropriate marital commitment, how should the law decide if those commitments have 
been met?   
                                                 
207 Carbone,supra note 88 at  65 .   
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Formulas avoid particularized moral line drawing, though the alimony formulas 
drafted to date derive from originally discretionary judgments.   The charge of the county 
in Maricopa County, Arizona to its commission on alimony reform is particularly 
noteworthy in this regard.   The county asked technicians to design formulas that reflect 
average current alimony awards, rather than design formulas that define alimony 
obligations.208 Current practice derives from the decisions that judges currently make.  
Those decisions are guided, to the extent they are guided, by the various factors listed in 
the statute, which gives judges discretion.  The experience of the Massachusetts judiciary 
is comparable.  Judges derived their own formulae, based on their own prior decisions, 
which had been derived from the list of discretionary factors.209  Judges are fed up with 
those factors, but grant the factors at least enough legitimacy to act as the basis of a 
formula that will then set a more transparent reliable norm.   
 If alimony formulas come to be used and perceived as child support formulas are, 
few people will bother to understand the alimony models or the theories of obligation on 
which they are based.  Judges will just apply them.  Presumably, in such a world, 
technicians could substitute arbitrary numbers for any determination of average alimony 
award and the reformers would accept them as long as they did not strike them as too 
outlandish.  With such a rule, parties would have a firmer norm around which to bargain 
and it is likely that alimony would be demanded more predictably, determined more 
reliably and consume less court time.  Parties would understand what awards were likely 
to be, even if they did not understand what the awards were meant to represent.  As with 
                                                 
208  The Commission was tasked with designing guidelines that would “reflect current practice more than 
set norms for it.”   Ellman, supra note 94 at 811.  
209 See supra note 105.  
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child support and property, what would matter is a rule and an arbitrary one could easily 
work just as well as the current methodology.    
 
 
IV. Defending the Arbitrary 
The foregoing analysis establishes that the rules governing family obligation are not 
based on decades of collective wisdom or moral consensus.  They are mostly arbitrary.  
They are used either without relying on any theoretical base or by relying on a theatrical 
base that is likely controversial.   For child support, the average marginal expenditure 
methodology upon which all the child support formulas are based relies on a 2 parent 
family household norm that is contested at both a descriptive and prescriptive level.  And 
there is little coherence in the set of rules that determines who counts as a parent for 
obligation purposes.  Comparably, the 50/50 distribution rule for marital property, though 
often presented as neutral and/or intuitively fair can be readily criticized as neither.  
Indeed, it represents a particular normative view of marriage and it does not render 
intuitively fair results in many situations.  The emerging alimony formulas are perhaps 
the most transparently arbitrary. In essence, the reform commissions have said “Bring us 
some algorithms.  We don’t even want a theory for why they are appropriate.”  
When evaluated contextually, however, this increasingly acontextual system of 
family law obligation is eminently defensible.  It is also a logical outgrowth of a world in 
which diverse family forms proliferate and social acceptance of that diversity grows 
stronger.   The very same social forces that make the formulae seem anachronistic and 
idiosyncratic make them necessary.  
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A. Child Support 
Contemporary child support guidelines seem anachronistic because they so 
completely rely on a biological family norm that so often does not and often never did 
exist for the parties subject to the guidelines.  Recent scholarship calling for a re-
evaluations of how the law grants parental rights seems to be advocating for a legal 
family law regime that recognizes how rare that biological family form is. The 
scholarship advocates more discretion so as to afford the law more freedom to evaluate 
all the contexts in which families arise. 210   
Attention to context is what the law allowed before Congress mandated child-support 
formulas, however.211  Congress mandated formulas because it was concerned about how 
few resources were available to children through child support. The government was 
spending more money supporting children because changing demographics were making 
it increasingly likely that children would be living in households without their fathers.  
    Because there was so much money to collect from so many different people in 
different situations, policy makers had to be concerned about implementing a resource 
redistribution system that was clear, easy-to-apply, and widely applicable.  More and 
more fathers were never parties to a divorce action.  More and more fathers now lived 
with new families. More and more fathers were harder to track down.  The time and 
money spent paying attention to all those contexts would inevitably detract from 
children’s ability to get resources quickly.  Thus, not surprisingly, policy makers 
produced formulae that were overbroad, acontextual, and riddled with hidden value 
choices.  The formulas work not because they evaluate obligation fairly or accurately, but 
                                                 
210 See supra notes 32-36. 
211  See supra text accompanying notes 60-62 (explaining why Congress mandated that states develop child 
support guidelines) 
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because they provide quick, stable numbers.    With so many children and adults 
dependent on child support,  a system that works becomes critical.  
As suggested above, a more graduated formula system might be better able to capture 
the degrees of parenthood that seem prevalent today, but the more sensitive the formula 
was to context, the less well the system would work.  A payor who wanted a lesser 
obligation could argue that there is a new parent in the family who should share the 
obligation.  The more parents there are, the greater the chances of some adult 
experiencing a change of circumstances that might necessitate altering the child support 
allocation.  All such dilemmas would take time and resources to adjudicate.  They would 
also involve inquiries into the realities of the children’s and parents’ lives.   
These are just some of the questions a court would need to address:  Has an adult 
developed a sufficiently important relationship with a child for that relationship to 
warrant the imposition of obligation?  Who’s views about the relationship should count?  
The child’s?  The potential obligor?  A current obligor who may know nothing about the 
potential obligor, but has much to gain from someone else being obligated? How should a 
judge allocate responsibilities between obligors? What if one obligor already has 
outstanding duties to another set of children?  Should the formalization of the parental 
obligation to either set of children matter or just the reliance of the children?  What about 
the reliance of another parent?  How many other parents?  When is such reliance 
reasonable? What if one set of children find a new source of support, who should enjoy 
the windfall of that new support, the children or the obligor?   Should the obligor’s 
income or parenting philosophy or intent to parent be at all relevant?   
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These are very messy questions.  A parent and/or a child eager to secure and keep 
resources flowing might strongly resent how much time it took to answer the questions, 
how invasive the process of answering would be, and how many resources the whole 
process would drain.  An award derived from a formula based on a vanishing or arbitrary 
norm might be much preferred.   
B. Property Distribution 
A comparable story can be told about marital property distribution rules.  The 
very forces that make the 50/50 rule seem too rigid, make it increasingly attractive.  The 
sheer number of divorces, particularly the number of divorces that settle without seeing a 
courtroom, make the advantages of a bright line rule paramount.  The parties know the 
law.  There is little to fight about.  The empirical work done on mediation confirms that 
most parties mediate property distribution arrangements that are comparable to judicial 
awards. 212     
Just as important, the increasing discomfort (and possible constitutional difficulty) 
with using family law to enforce marital and sexual norms in the 1960s and 70s created a 
countervailing need for financial norms.  When divorcing parties had to prove fault, the 
party least anxious for a divorce had more bargaining power to secure an adequate 
property settlement.  For instance, if the party least anxious for divorce really wanted the 
house, she could often get it in exchange for a no-contest divorce.   Judges then, as now, 
often only cursorily reviewed the divorce settlement because the parties presented it to 
the court as a fait accompli.  If the party most anxious for divorce held no property, she 
                                                 
212  See supra note 68.  
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could be left with nothing, but her financial predicament could be justified because, as far 
as the law was concerned, by wanting the divorce, she was blameworthy.    
With the advent of no-fault divorce and the law’s decreasing willingness to 
enforce moral and sexual norms, two problems emerged.   First, the parties themselves, if 
they still wanted to avoid the courtroom, had virtually no rules to guide them in 
settlement.  Second, the law needed to be much more concerned about the party left with 
so little property.  She had done nothing wrong.  Her spouse was free to divorce her at his 
will and, even if she was the one eager for divorce, the law was now unwilling to call her 
blameworthy.   How should the law decide what she should get?  
Many wives now contribute financially to the household.213   Many also do not, or 
they contribute little, particularly when children are small.214  Many wives do less 
household work than they used to.215  But most wives still do much more than their 
husbands.216  Many wives have a work history that parallels their husbands, but most 
likely on a different plane, earning less money.   How should judges evaluate all the 
different ways in which married couples now choose to construct their lives? 
The long list of factors that the original equitable distribution statutes provided  
was probably meant to help address these problems. The factors gave judges, and to a 
certain extent the parties, something on which to base a property settlement.  But the 
growing heterogeneity of families and the social acceptance of that heterogeneity made 
the application of those factors all but lawless.  As one scholar suggested at the time 
                                                 
213 Zoe Savitsky, Recent Developments: Inertia and Change: Findings of The Shriver Report and Next 
Steps, 25 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 172,174 (Spring, 2010). 
214  Id. at 175. 
215 SUZANNE BIANCHI, JOHN ROBINSON, MELISSA MILKIE, CHANGING RHYTHMS OF AMERICAN LIFE  90 
(Russell Sage Foundation, 2006). 
216 Id. 
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“what consistently distinguishes [equitable distribution statutes] from their predecessors 
is not that they are more equitable, but that they are more unpredictable.” 217     
It is common for social commentators of all sorts to mock the uniformity of 
American post-World War II, “Leave It To Beaver,” family structure, but those rigid 
norms made the law’s job much easier.  People who acted in accordance with the norms 
needed to be protected. Those who deviated did not.  Today, with so much deviation and 
so little normativity, it is much less clear who needs to be protected and why. A blanket 
property distribution rule avoids the need to make distinctions between kinds of couples.  
Everyone is entitled to the same division of property because people are no longer 
comfortable with the law making distinctions between kinds of marriages. 
A regime that paid much less attention to marital status would be a regime in 
which people’s post-relationship obligations would be determined by judicial evaluation 
of the relationship, marital or not.218  Was it the kind of relationship for which the law 
should impose post-relationship obligation? What made it that kind of relationship?  
Should a judge assume that the parties meant to share?  Why?  If the law abandons any 
presumption of sharing, should it entertain claims pertaining to reliance or dependence?  
Does relative dependence matter or only absolute dependence?  Does longevity of the 
relationship matter?  Why?  Would we trust courts to arrive at remotely comparable 
assessments in comparable cases?  Many people might rather a world in which their 
obligations and entitlements were set simply by the arbitrary rules of marriage to a world 
                                                 
217 Glendon, supra note 80 at 1556.  
218 Alternatively, courts might rely on explicit written relationship contracts, but drafting those contracts 
does not appear to be a relationship activity that very many people wish to engage in at all. See supra note 
190. 
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in which they had to worry about all of these invasive questions being asked of and about 
them.   
C. Alimony 
The way in which alimony formulae are currently being designed and implemented 
throughout the country suggest yet another version of the same story.  The collapse of 
social and marital norms leave judges without a normative yardstick by which to measure 
entitlement.  The intuitive understandings of fairness that led judges to refuse to abandon 
alimony altogether,219 provide sufficient justification for a blanket system of entitlement 
that pays heed to length of marriage and income differential – though nothing else.  The 
formulas that Bar Committees and judges are implementing now eschew the various 
theories of entitlement that academics have offered.220  Instead, they emphasize  
predictability.  Fairness will follow not from moral consensus about entitlement but from 
a formula. The norm will be reliable because it will be reduced to numbers. What the 
practitioners of family law are demanding are rules they can litigate and settle by.  They 
are willing to cede the responsibility for determining when and why family obligation 
arise to legal status distinctions and arbitrary formulas because of the disadvantages 
associated with a more sensitive system of justice. 
D. Summary 
The moral frameworks and normative structures upon which the law used to 
gauge family obligation have all but disappeared.   Formulas have taken their place and 
judges, lawyers and litigants all seem remarkably content with that formulaic system. The 
                                                 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.  (The move to no-fault was accompanied by a move to 
eliminate alimony so that the spouses could “go their separate ways,” but many judges refused to deny 
alimony to women who had invested heavily in their families but had few prospects of meaningful 
employment.)   
220 See supra notes 103-105.  
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willingness of judges and lawyers to accept and even encourage these formulas says 
something striking about the frustration with flexible standards.   
In other areas of the law, criminal sentencing for instance, judges have strongly 
resisted guidelines. Like the child support guidelines, the Criminal Sentencing Guidelines 
were instigated by Congress to be implemented by judges in order to bring rationality and 
consistency to a discretionary process.   Judges bemoan the Criminal Sentencing 
Guidelines as ill-conceived and unjust and far too insensitive to context.221  In that area, 
judges value discretion and seem to have faith that discretion renders fairer results.  Not 
so with family law obligations.   
Lawyers are comparably accepting of the guidelines, even though they have an 
economic interest in more discretionary standards. Domestic relations lawyers, like most 
lawyers, get paid by the hour.222  In theory, the less certain the rules, the longer it takes to 
resolve a case.  Yet lawyers have been as big a part of the task forces for alimony reform 
as judges.223  Lawyers have not pushed back hard against the 50/50 division rule.  The 
yearning for consistency and predictability appears strong enough to overcome both 
institutional and economic interest. 
Without formulas, judges confront the panoply of questions.  Family members 
and their lawyers strain to answer them.  Who is a parent?  Why?  How much should this 
kind of parent have to pay?  Why?  Were these two people a unit?  Why? How much of a 
unit and for what?  What is a fair resolution?  Why?  Judges and lawyers have expressed 
                                                 
221 Nathan Greenblatt, How Mandatory Are Mandatory Minimums? How Judges Can Avoid Imposing 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (Fall, 2008).  
222 Contingency fees have been struck down in the divorce context as against public policy.  See HARRIS, 
TEITELBAUM, CARBONE, supra note 57 at 754.  
223  The ALI is made up of both practicing lawyers and legal academics.  The American Academy of 
Matrimonial Lawyers, which developed their own guidelines, see supra note 102  is made up only of 
practicing lawyers.   
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an unmistakable desire to avoid these questions.  And most litigants probably want to 
avoid them as well.  Not only are they invasive and time-consuming. They are expensive.  
Only a tiny percentage of the millions of people affected by the law of family obligation 
have the resources or desire to litigate fully the scope of their obligations and 
entitlements.  Thus, despite how easy it is to criticize and even mock the formulas by 
which the law assesses family obligation, a formulaic system is quite easy to defend as 
well.  Diverse family form and the social acceptance of that diversity make attention to 
context extremely onerous.        
 
V. Ramifications  
 
A. The Law’s Role in Defining Family    
The analysis presented above suggests that, whatever different people’s 
understandings of their own kinship networks, the law does a prodigious amount of work 
in defining family.  For instance, the 50/50 distribution rule plays a formative role in the 
substantive definition of marriage.  It makes the marital commitment substantial.  It 
provides insurance for those spouses who choose to become financially dependent.  It 
facilitates the division of paid and unpaid labor.   It rejects the earner’s priority principle 
and the contribution principle as inconsistent with marriage.  It sets a default rule that 
allows and encourages couples to think of themselves as an entity.   Those who believe 
that fairness in their marriage should mean something other than 50/50 have the burden 
of drafting and implementing a prenuptial contract that will say so.   
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The vast majority of people getting married today may be ignorant of this 
definitional work done by the 50/50 rule because they neither sign a prenuptial agreement 
nor think much about the financial rules that accompany marriage.224  But the divorce 
rate suggests that a huge portion of people who may have been ignorant of the 50%  rule 
when they entered marriage, live by it later when they divorce.  The failure of divorcing 
parties to protest the rule, and anecdotal evidence of what divorcing parties feel entitled 
to, suggest that people really are comfortable with the law doing that definitional work.  
Divorcing parties routinely walk into their attorney’s office saying “I only want what is 
fair.” 225 But they ask their lawyer what is fair.  Their lawyer tells them what the law is. 
The law says fair is 50/50.  The formula defines the fairness and in doing so it helps 
define what marriage is.226  
 Comparably, few parents contest the law’s imposition of a percentage-of-income-
rule for child support purposes.  At the extremes of poverty and wealth the guidelines 
sometimes give way to context, and the different formulas provide some modification to 
the exact percentage, but for the most part it is accepted.  As suggested above, there is 
little reason to think that different percentages would encounter much resistance.  
Precious few people understand where the marginal expenditure figure comes from 
anyway.  Litigants, judges, lawyers and scholars simply accept the law’s role in defining 
parental obligation. In doing so, they accept the law’s role in defining parenthood.    
                                                 
224 Frantz, supra note 185 at 272 
225 Various conversations with Chicago area family law attorneys (Fall, 2010) 
226 It is possible, though I think unlikely, that when they ask for what is fair, litigants are instead saying  “I 
understand the need for a clear default rule in this context because litigation is expensive and I’m probably 
better off with a clear default than with an murky standard which might allow me to end up paying less.”  
Most divorcing parties are much less likely than most people contracting in a commercial context to be 
familiar with the advantages of clear default rules and there is abundant evidence that divorce is often so 
emotionally difficult that parties find it difficult to think clearly.  See Thomas Carbonneau, A Consideration 
of Alternatives to Divorce Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV 1119, 1126 (1986).  
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 The comprehensive, non-discretionary obligations imposed by formulae avoid 
the need for invasive, expensive and time-consuming questions, but they also cede to the 
law a critical role in defining what family means.  It seems, then, that we have 
relinquished a great deal of power to the state.  In a world with these formulae, obligation 
does not come from context or agreement or reliance.  It comes from state recognized 
status.  A parent pays 20% of his or her income in child support because that is how the 
law defines parenthood, just as the law declares that marriage requires an equal sharing of 
all either party earns during the marriage.   
B. Constitutional Claims 
Recognizing the primacy of the state’s role in defining the family in this way may 
simultaneously weaken and strengthen different constitutional claims to family status.   
Those who argue that people have a fundamental right to either marital or parental status 
must reckon with how much definitional work we have ceded to the state.  If the state has 
so much authority to define what marital property is and how much of it has to be 
divided, why shouldn’t the state also decide who should be entitled to that division?   
How could someone have a fundamental right to a marital status that the 50/50 
distribution rule helps define, when the state can easily change that 50/50 rule (quite 
possibly without anyone even protesting) tomorrow?  If the state decides who is a parent 
and who is not for purposes of child support and if the state can define the obligations of 
that parental status based on arbitrary declarations of appropriate responsibility, how can 
someone have a fundamental right to parental status?   
There are answers to these questions – and ways of salvaging some sort of 
fundamental right to family status.  Cass Sunstein, David Meyer and myself have all 
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suggested that fundamental rights to family status are a function of social norms that give 
those statuses meaning, meanings that exist apart from any strict legal definition. 227    
The ability to conform to those social norms has expressive value that perhaps the state 
must honor.  But social norms are not fixed by either time or geography.  Social norms 
regarding marriage and parenthood can vary across time and region and the law’s 
abdication of much of its role in policing moral and sexual norms in marriage may make 
it more likely that norms will vary greatly across time and region.  This does not bode 
particularly well for fundamental rights claims to family status at a national level. 
By the same token, recognizing the primacy of the state’s role in defining family 
may strengthen equality claims to family status.  If the family is a state, not a private or 
pre-legal institution, then the need to treat all citizens equally with regard to that 
institution increases.  The state may be able to define what marriage and parenthood are, 
but equality jurisprudence dictates that everyone be given equal access to those 
institutions.  
To date, one state supreme court and one federal district court have found that 
same sex couples have a fundamental right to marry.228  The other state courts that have 
                                                 
227 Cass Sunstein has suggested that the fundamental right to marry is best conceived of as an expressive 
right, but “the expressive benefits of marriage are contingent on a particular constellation of social norms;  
there is nothing inevitable bout them.” Cass Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARD. L. REV. 2081, 2098 
(2005);  David Meyer has argued that the constitution treats parental status as it treats property rights. The 
state is free to define a vast expanse of property rights and to tinker with them at will, but it is not free to 
alter those rights so substantially that property loses its contemporary meaning.  David D. Meyer, Partners, 
Caregivers and the Constitutional Substance of Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY supra note 87 
at 47, 61.   I have argued that the constitutional rights to both marital and parental status reflect expressive 
values implicit in the label “married” and “parent,” but that those rights are necessarily cabined by the 
social meaning of both marriage and parenthood.  Baker, supra note 139 at 132.     
228 In Re Marriage Cases, 193 P 2d 384, 399 (2008) found that gays and lesbians had both a fundamental 
right and an equality right to marriage.   These constitutional conclusions with regard to marriage per se 
were substantially overturned by the same California Supreme Court in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P3d 48, 76 
(Cal., 2009), which upheld Proposition 8 and declared that whatever constitutional rights gays and lesbian 
couples were entitled to under fundamental rights analysis were satisfied with the conferral of Domestic 
Partnership status.  In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the federal district court found Proposition 8 
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found in favor of same sex marriage have relied on equality doctrine.  The analysis 
presented here suggests that equality doctrine holds more promise and that the U.S. 
Supreme Court cases suggesting that there is a fundamental right to marital status should 
be read narrowly.229 
C.  Family Construction Claims 
As indicated in Part I, much recent family law scholarship argues that the law of 
the family needs substantial re-orientation.  In various forms, different authors have 
argued against the normativity of any family status.  According to these views, the law 
should play a minimal if any role in defining or privileging family forms.  Instead, the 
law should respond to emotional and familial attachments as lived or chosen.  The 
analysis in this article forces a question on this line of scholarship:  Should there be any 
legally enforceable family obligations?   
Consider marital property distribution.  If the time has come to break down the 
conventional normativity of domestic relations law, we should be wary of a ubiquitous 
                                                                                                                                                 
unconstitutional under both fundamental rights and equality analysis.   The Supreme Courts of Iowa, 
Varnum v. Brien, 763 NW2d 862, 899 (Iowa, 2009) and Connecticut, Kerrigan v. Comm’r, 957 A.2d 407, 
479 (Conn. 2008) decided in favor of same sex marriage using an equality analysis not a fundamental right 
to marriage analysis.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts collapsed the two doctrines completely 
and used a rational basis test to find in favor of same sex marriage, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub Health, 798 
NE2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).  Thus, it would be quite inaccurate to say that the Massachusetts court found 
a fundamental right to marry.  
229 Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) (finding that miscegenation statutes were racially discriminatory 
and finding a fundamental right to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US 374 (1978)  (striking down a 
Wisconsin statute under the because it inhibited the right to marry under the Equal Protection clause; 
Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (state prison cannot bar a prisoner from marrying because doing so 
violates the right to marry found in Zablocki).  For instance, the marriage that the Supreme Court declared 
that Mildred Loving had a fundamental right to in 1967 included no rights to be protected from marital rape 
or to sue her spouse in tort and  no obligation to support her husband  if they separated.  Today, she would 
have rights to all of that because the prior marital rules and norms have been  struck down as antithetical to 
modern notions of marriage and gender equality norms. See People v. Liberta, 474 NE2d 567 (NY 1984) 
(striking down the marital exception to rape law as irrational); Burns v. Burns, 518 So.2d 1205 (Miss. 
1988)  (finding the common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity to be inconsistent with 
constitutional and statutory notions of gender equity); Orr v. Orr, 440 US 268 (1979) (striking down as 
violative of equal protection a legislative judgments that husbands but not wives should be  responsible for 
alimony).  So what is it that Mildred Loving had a fundamental right to?  It was not the understanding of 
marriage that we have today.  
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50/50 divide.  If the law should afford more respect to individuals’ decisions to structure 
their home life as they choose, we should question a blanket rule for redistribution of 
resources.   The demographic changes of the last 40 years arguably require much more 
attention to context and detail so that courts can evaluate how much sharing a couple 
actually did, how much interdependence existed between them, how much monetary or 
nonmonetary contribution each spouse made. 
Those are exactly the kinds of details that have been dismissed as irrelevant or 
impossible to evaluate by the courts, however. The people responsible for enforcing the 
law of family obligations have rejected a system in which obligation arises from context.  
It is too unwieldy.  But if obligation should not arise from context because the courts are 
institutionally incapable or unwilling to evaluate context, nor from status because the 
state should not impose status, from whence should family obligation arise?   
Without going into detail, some scholars have suggested that decreasing the 
state’s role in defining the family will require an increased state role in meeting 
dependency.230   There is an irony or perhaps just a strong dose of utopian thinking here: 
The way to decrease the state’s power in setting family norms is to increase the state’s 
financial involvement in people’s lives.   The Supreme Court has not been very receptive 
to this kind of argument before, finding that the state has a right to follow its money.231  
                                                 
230 Murray and Ristrophe, supra note 40 at 140. (“Though we cannot develop the argument at length here, 
we believe a disestablishment perspective is consistent with substantial public financial support for 
caregiving in families.”)  
231 Wyman v. James, 400 US 309, 319 (1971) (Finding that a social worker inspection of an aid recipient’s 
home was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because “[o]ne who dispenses purely 
private charity naturally has an interest in and expects to know how his charitable funds are utilized and put 
to work.  The public, when it is the provider, rightly expects the same.  It might well expect more, because 
of the trust aspect of public funds, and the recipient, as well as the caseworker, has not only an interest but 
an obligation”).   
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And it seems quite likely that if government were to take over all of the obligation to 
meet individual dependencies, our understanding of family membership would change.    
In order to impose obligations, the law needs to determine entitlements and 
responsibilities.  In the last 20 years, the law has moved toward a system in which those 
entitlements and responsibilities are determined from a distance, based on average 
numbers, normative theories of family and legal status distinctions. The cost of context 
has been adjudged too high.  The analysis presented here raises doubts about whether we 
can have both a world in which the law enforces family obligations and a world in which 
the law does not privilege certain family forms.    
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This article’s defense of the current formulaic system does not ineluctably mean 
that the current system should be defended.  The arbitrariness of the current system is 
undeniable.  Anachronistic and contested normative visions of parenthood and marriage 
permeate the legal treatment of family obligation.  Without doubt, reformers could (and I 
think, in many instances should) tweak parts of this system.  The law of parental 
obligation could develop a more logical means of determining what sort of commitment 
to parent should trigger responsibility.  Models based on equivalence scales could be 
rejected in favor of more transparent, though perhaps less theoretical, baselines.  The 
50/50 rule for property distribution could be changed to a more proportional contribution 
rule.  One can easily provide arguments in favor of all these changes, but it is unlikely 
that these types of changes will solve the basic over and under inclusiveness problems 
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that result from determining family obligation based on pre-defined understandings of 
what families are and how they operate.    
Thus, as the scholarship argues, more profound changes may be necessary.  
Perhaps the arbitrariness and contested normative ideals analyzed in this article should be 
more regularly highlighted so that they can be rejected.  Perhaps the relevant players have 
gotten the cost/benefit analysis wrong:  Judges, lawyers and litigants should be compelled 
to ask and attempt to answer the hard normative questions because in doing so they will 
allow the law to incorporate a more coherent, nuanced,  framework for family obligation. 
This article suggests that pushing the law to answer these hard normative 
questions will not be easy and for many people may not be desirable.    However varied 
their own normative visions of family life, people may not want judges, lawyers and 
litigants asking formative questions about family composition at every opportunity.  
People may be willing to cede to the state the role of defining family status so that the 
law can reliably impose family obligation.   
Sir Henry Maine famously prophesized that the trajectory of the law was one 
from status to contract,232 but despite the massive upheaval in both family life and family 
law over the last forty years, the salience of family status has grown more, not less 
important to the imposition of legal obligation.  The flaws in this status-based system of 
obligation are obvious.  Much less obvious is whether a system based on something other 
than status could effectively impose family obligations at all. 
                                                 
232  See R H Graveson, The Movement from Status to Contract, 4 MODERN L. REV 261, 261 (1941) 
(discussing Sir Henry Maine’s famous axiom).   
